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The Prism of COGSA
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY*
COGSA, however, requires that we view container cases through a different
prism.
I
INTRODUCTION
I first met Jay Joseph, the founder of our Journal, in early spring 1969 at
a planning meeting at New York University with our first editor, Professor
Albert H. Garretson; our third editor, Professor Nicholas J. Healy; my
Fordham colleague, Professor Ludwik A. Teclaff, and his wife Eileen; and
Professors Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Julius J. Marke, and Michael A. Schwind
of the NYU faculty. Thirty years later, the Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce is the leading publication in admiralty and international maritime
affairs due to the guiding hand of Jay Joseph, who, like a prudent master, has
recruited an expert crew and charted a careful course through the perils of
publication.
There was an element of adventure in 1969, as it was uncertain how the
various constituencies that make up the maritime industry would react to a
theoretical, even academic, presentation of the problems of admiralty law,
the law of the sea, and maritime resources. At that first meeting Jay was, as
he continues to be, steadfast, gentle, genial, and totally supportive. We can
be proud of the achievements of the Journal today as we congratulate Jay
and his lovely and gracious wife Ann on the joyous occasion of Jay's 80th
birthday and the 30th volume of the Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce.
*The John D. Calamari Distinguished Professor of Law, Fordham University. A.B., Harvard
University; J.D., Boston University; LL.M., Columbia University. Member of the Editorial Board of the
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce. The author served as U.S. Representative and Chairman of
Delegation to the diplomatic conferences to replace the Hague Rules in 1978 (The Hamburg Rules) and
to amend them in 1979 (The SDR Amendment).
'Monica Textile Corp. v. S.S. Tana, 952 F.2d 636, 641, 1992 AMC 609 (2d Cir. 1991) (McLaughlin, J.).
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II
BACKGROUND
This article began as a meditation on the Supreme Court's 1995 decision,
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer,2 which changed the existing
doctrine that choice of forum and choice of law clauses in bills of lading may
be invalid to oust the jurisdiction of American courts over shipments to or
from the United States under the Hague Rules treaty3 and the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).4 Sky Reefer presents a problem in the
interpretation of a text that is both a statute and a treaty.
It soon became apparent that Sky Reefer was but a small part of a much
larger problem of textual interpretation, to which the Supreme Court appears
to be giving inconsistent treatment. This article cannot encompass the entire
history of textual interpretation, let alone a review of all recent interpretation
cases; thus, its scope will be limited to the subject of international
transportation.
While maritime transport involves a text that is both a statute and a treaty
and concerns only cargo damage, air transport involves a treaty only, but
deals with carrier liabilities to both passengers and cargo. Although both
treaties-the Hague Rules of 1924 and the Warsaw Convention of 19295-
came out of the same historical period, there is little evidence that either one
influenced the other; maritime law had a long history with profound
policy-based decisions, while the air transport industry did not yet exist.
The original and only authentic texts of both conventions are in the French
language. Because there is no American statute covering the Air Law
Convention, American courts must struggle with French grammar and
vocabulary. They never, however, consult the French original in maritime
cases because of COGSA, whose terms are controlling in American courts
in any dispute over a treaty provision.
Just as a transparent crystal prism focuses and enlarges the image under
study, it is the goal of this article to examine the decisional history of
COGSA and to find the historical background and evidence of the intent of
its drafters in 1936 and determine how that intent has been developed over
the 63 years since enactment. COGSA has never been amended and we
2515 U.S. 528, 1995 AMC 1817 (1995).
31nternational Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading,
Brussels, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 (U.S. ratification proclaimed
effective Dec. 29, 1937 (51 Stat. 246)).
4Act of Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 229, Pub. L. No. 74-521, 49 Stat. 1207, effective from July 15, 1936 (49
Stat. 1213), now codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315.
5Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
Warsaw, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. II (U.S. ratification proclaimed
effective Oct. 29, 1934 (49 Stat. 3013)).
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presently remain uncertain whether an international consensus can ever be
achieved on changing it. Assuming, however, that COGSA will remain in
some form, it is time to apply modern interpretive scholarship to it-the
most important and most frequently litigated statute in American interna-
tional trade. We must also bear in mind that COGSA emerged from a treaty
ratified by the United States; thus, it must be interpreted both as treaty and
statute, In either case, preparation of this article has been made much easier
by the legislative histories prepared by Professor Michael F. Sturley.6
III
MARITIME TRANSPORT
It is appropriate to look at the history of the allocation of cargo damage
liability and the circumstances of the passage of COGSA 7 before we analyze
the few Supreme Court decisions8 of treaty interpretation and statutory
construction 9 to discern the prism of COGSA.
The case from which the "prism of COGSA" language is taken involved
the narrow issue of the unit limitation of liability ($500 per package).' 0
There had been damage to a cargo of 76 bales of cloth stowed inside a
container (20' x 8' x 8') that was being shipped from Africa to Savannah,
Georgia. The cloth was damaged by salt water. The bill of lading described
the contents as 76 bales of cotton cloth in the "description" column of the
bill of lading, but in the column headed "No. of Pkgs." the typed figure "1"
was found." The carrier defendant argued that its liability was limited to
$500 because of bill of lading language that defined a container as one
package.
The District Court rejected the carrier's argument and ruled for the cargo
6Essential documents of the 1924 International Convention and COGSA are printed in The
Legislative History of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and the Travaux Prrparatoires of the Hague
Rules (M. Sturley ed. 1990) [hereinafter cited as Leg. Hist.] See also Sturley, The History of COGSA and
the Hague Rules, 22 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1 (1991) [hereinafter cited as COGSA History], and Sturley, The
History of the Hague Rules and the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, [19911 11 Diritto
Marittimo 1.7See infra notes 117-91 and accompanying text.
8See infra notes 192-319 and accompanying text.
9 Professor William Tetley reminds us of the distinction between the word "construction," favored by
common law lawyers, and "interpretation," favored by those trained in the civil law, but cites Corbin to
the effect that the distinction is by no means necessary. W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 83 (3d ed. 1988)
(citing 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 534, at 13 (1960)). In the view of Professor Hans Kelsen,
however, "There are no principles concerning the interpretation of treaties different from those
concerning the interpretation of other legal instruments." H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law 460
(2d rev. ed. 1966).
l°Monica Textile Corp. v. S.S. Tana, 952 F. Supp. 636, 1992 AMC 609 (2d Cir. 1991).
"Id. at 637.
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owner, citing Second Circuit authority on shipping containers.12 After the
trial court decision's in Monica Textile,' 3 however, the Second Circuit
decided Seguros Illimani S.A. v. MIV Popi P, 14 which seemed to elevate the
legal effect of the number of packages column in the bill of lading over the
cargo description column; accordingly, the District Court reversed itself and
awarded only the $500 package limitation amount. 15 The Monica Textile bill
of lading defined the shipping container as one package in a minuscule
pre-printed exculpatory clause, allegedly reflecting the agreement of the
parties.
The Second Circuit, however, reversed,' 6 noting that it had consistently
cast a jaundiced eye on exculpatory agreements which are "against the grain
of COGSA."' 17 Examining the face of the bill of lading, the court found no
agreement but rather an inherent ambiguity.' 8 Seguros Illimani was rejected
as analogous because the court's decision in that case was not whether one
container is one package but rather whether each individual tin ingot inside
the container was a package or whether a bundle of 15 ingots was the
package.
In Seguros Illimani, the cargo owner argued that there were 9,000
packages with a value of $4,500,000; the carrier argued that there were 600
packages with a value $300,000. In Monica Textile, the Second Circuit
concluded that Seguros Illimani was not a container case, but a pallet case; 19
thus, the bill of lading definition of a container as one package was a
unilateral, self-serving, and ambiguous declaration by the carrier that was
not negotiated by the parties.20 The opinion traced the history of the $500 per
package doctrine through the changes in shipping practices since the Second
World War and disposed of inapposite holdings because COGSA requires "a
different prism." 2'
The prism of COGSA designed by Congress can be observed in the
court's textual and intentional reading of the historical record:
Long before COGSA was enacted, industrialized nations recognized the
need to reconcile the desire of carriers to limit their potential liability with their
vastly superior bargaining power over shippers .... The nations at the Brussels
l2 Mitsui & Co., Ltd. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d 807, 1981 AMC 331 (2d Cir. 1981).
13Monica Textile Corp. v. S.S. Tana, 731 F. Supp. 124, 1990 AMC 1639 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
14929 F.2d 89, 1991 AMC 1521 (2d Cir. 1991).
'
5 Monica Textile Corp. v. S.S. Tana, 765 F. Supp. 1194, 1991 AMC 2378 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
16952 F.2d at 637. See also All Pacific Trading, Inc. v. M/V Hanjin Yosu, 7 F.3d 1427, 1994 AMC
365 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1194 (1994).
17952 F.2d at 641.
1"1d. at 642.
'
91d. at 640.
201d. at 643.
211d. at 641.
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Convention of 1924 balanced these competing concerns with a per-package
limitation on liability. ... The principles established by the Brussels Conven-
tion became the template for COGSA .... 22
A teleological interpretation 23 of that treaty was found in Leather's Best,
Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx,24 also cited in Monica Textile, in its application of
the treaty to containers, a transport mode that did not exist in 1936. In
Leather's Best, Judge Friendly had written:
The difficulty presented in this case ... is that "[flew, if any, in 1936 could
have foreseen the change in the optimum size of shipping units that has arisen
as the result of technological advances in the transportation industry." [T]he
problem demands a solution better than the courts can afford, preferably on an
international scale .... Meanwhile the courts must wrestle with a statutory
provision that has become ill-suited to present conditions .... Still we cannot
escape the belief that the purpose of § 4(5) of COGSA was to set a reasonable
figure below which the carrier should not be permitted to limit his liability and
that "package" is thus more sensibly related to the unit in which the shipper
packed the goods and described them than to a large metal object, functionally
a part of the ship, in which the carrier caused them to be "contained. ' 25
While Monica Textile's prism of COGSA analysis illustrates the problems
in hundreds of cargo damage cases where unit limitation is involved, it also
illustrates generally the necessary background for the interpretation or
construction of COGSA in other contexts.26
IV
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CARGO DAMAGE LITIGATION
A. Developments to 1893
The new United States of America was already an important trading
nation in 1789, furnishing grain, fish, rum, and lumber to Europe and the
European colonies in the West Indies. 27 Those cargoes were carried in an
increasing number of United States built and flagged vessels. This occurred
despite the maritime war between France and England, which began in 1793
221d. at 638. An intentional interpretation of the balancing of interests can be found in Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 1969 AMC 1741 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 964 (1970).231n a teleological interpretation of a treaty, unexpressed purposes of the treaty emerge over time to
fill in gaps in our understanding of the text and intent of the drafters.
24451 F.2d 800, 1971 AMC 2383 (2d Cir. 1971), cited at 952 F.2d 638-39.
25451 F.2d at 814-15.
26See infra notes 85-113 and 159-87 and accompanying text.27j. Hutchins, The American Maritime Industries and Public Policy, 1789-1914, 221-28 (1941); A.
Nevins, Sail On, The Story of the American Merchant Marine 19-30 (1946).
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and continued to 1815.28 Although the belligerents captured and destroyed
our neutral ships, the growth of the American fleet was actually stimulated
by these challenges. 29 At the conclusion of the war, regular liner service
began in 1816 in the North Atlantic trade, eventually using steamboats after
1819.30 Large iron and steel steam-powered vessels with greater cargo
carrying capacity began about mid-century. 3'
American shipyards turned out fast and efficient types of sailing vessels,
eventually trading to China and the East Indies legally while a vast and
profitable commerce was conducted illegally in the European colonies in
Latin America and Africa.32 This was still the age of the all-purpose
merchant, in which vessels were owned by groups of investors based on
town or family connections while cargoes were similarly owned by groups
of merchants who speculated that buyers could be found for their goods at
destination. The "common venture" concept of general average accurately
described the shipping reality: the same merchants who owned fractions of
the ship also owned fractions of the cargoes. 33 In fact, a representative of the
cargo owners, the supercargo, often sailed on the ship with the goods to look
after them and arrange sales. Modern bulk shipments were unknown except
in wartime, and goods were usually shipped in boxes, bales, bags, barrels,
and drums. Insurance on the hulls of vessels was widely available, but
insurance on cargoes and the liability insurance of owners to third parties
developed only gradually as part of marine insurance practices. 34
All these factors account for the absence of direct litigation between the
economic interests of shippers and carriers or the subrogation litigation by
cargo insurers against P & I clubs that is a conspicuous feature of modern
admiralty law. Legal treatises in this country and England simply did not
28Hutchins, supra note 27, at 184-88; Nevins, supra note 27, at 27-29.
29The cargo carrying capacity of the U.S. merchant fleet increased from 124,000 gross tons in 1789
to 840,000 gross tons in 1807. Hutchins, supra note 27, at 225-27.
3
°Id. at 228-46, 260-64, 327-32, 397-410, 441-50; Nevins, supra note 27, at 30-37; R. Albion,
Square Riggers on Schedule: The New York Sailing Packets to England, France and the Cotton Ports
(1938).3 1j. Morrison, A History of American Steam Navigation 19-27 (1903). See also The Advent of
Steam: The Merchant Steamship Before 1900 (R. Gardiner ed. 1993).32Hutchins, supra note 27, at 200-28; R. Albion & J. Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime-The American
Experience, 1775-1942, 65-125 (1942); S. Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-
1860, 96-118, 225-52 (1921).
33General average, of course, results when "any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is intentionally
and reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for the purpose of preserving from peril the
property involved in a common maritime adventure." Rule A, York-Antwerp Rules 1994, reprinted at 6
Benedict on Admiralty Doc No. 4-6 (7th rev. ed. 1999). See generally L. Buglass, Marine Insurance and
General Average (3d ed. 1991). For a further look at the merchants of this period. see R. Albion, The Rise
of New York Port, 1815-1860 (1939), and A. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial
Revolution in American Business 15 (1977).
341 A. Parks, The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance and Average 3-4 (1987).
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deal with questions of the apportionment of risks between the shippers and
carriers in cases of cargo damage 35 until the end of the century, after the
appearance of the Harter Act36 in 1893.
Specialization of functions37 came in during the vast increase in world
trade towards the end of the 19th century, a time when wooden sailing ships
were replaced by iron and steel vessels powered by steam and moved by
screw propellers. Wealthy investors in the age of the railroad and factory,
however, had more profitable avenues for their capital, and the American
owned fleet began to shrink in size and importance. 38 In the law, the
distinction between common carriage and private carriage became signifi-
cant. 39 In 1848, however, the United States Supreme Court held an ocean
carrier fully liable for the loss of a cargo of gold and silver coins, thus
imposing a high standard of care for cargo carriers in the landmark case of
The Lexington,40 despite strong exculpatory language in the bill of lading.
Liability in that case was based on both negligence and unseaworthiness, as
the shipper alleged that its cargo was carelessly stowed aboard a common
carrier's vessel that was carelessly, improperly, and negligently conducted
with imperfect and insufficient machinery.4'
The Lexington was a paddle-wheel steamboat engaged in regular multi-
modal liner service between New York and Boston.42 The shipper, the
Merchants' Bank of Boston, shipped a wooden chest of gold and silver coins
without informing the carrier of the contents, although the weight of the
coins may have made its valuable contents obvious. 43 The bill of lading
excepted "danger of fire, water, breakage, leakage, and all other accidents"
and limited carrier liability to $200 per package. 44 Additionally, the carrier
had posted signs at the loading dock and its business offices that shipments
were at the risk of the owners.45 The vessel departed from New York at 4:00
p.m. on January 13, 1840, but a fire broke out at 7:30 p.m. that could not be
controlled. The ship sank in Long Island Sound off Fisher's Island before
35H. Flanders, Treatise on Maritime Law (1852); A. Browne, A Compendious View of the Civil Law
and of the Law of the Admiralty (American ed. 1840).36Act of Feb. 13, 1893, ch. 105, §§ 81-196, 27 Stat. 445, now codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-196.
37Chandler, supra note 33, at 15.
38Nevins, supra note 27, at 44-59.
39 See Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7 (1858).
4°New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston (The Lexington), 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344
(1848). See also Sweeney, The Admiralty Law of Arthur Browne, 26 J. Mar. L. & Com. 59, 129-31
(1995).
4147 U.S. at 350-52.
421d. at 344-47.
43Id. at 346-47.
44Id.
451d.
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midnight, taking the lives of all but four of the 150 passengers and causing
the loss of plaintiff's chest of coins, allegedly worth $18,000.46
The shipowner denied the allegations of negligence, asserted that its
servants exercised ordinary care, but that in any event it was not liable to the
shipper for the loss because of its notices of non-liability in the bill of lading
exculpatory clause and posted signs.47 Justice Nelson's majority opinion48
held that the exculpatory language could not overcome the insurer's
obligations as common carrier, thus the shipper could recover its full
damages. 49
Reaction to the decision, based on carrier outrage, was not favorable, and
461d. at 350.
4 71d. at 352.
4 81d. at 392. Chief Justice Taney and Justices McLean and Wayne joined the opinion, while Justices
Catron and Woodbury concurred in the result. Justice Daniel issued a dissent, which was joined in by
Justice Grier. Justice McKinley did not participate.
Samuel Nelson (1792-1873) was the Supreme Court's admiralty expert in the middle years of the
19th century, having served 27 years (1845-72). His appointment by President John Tyler followed
Senate rejection or withdrawal of three previous nominees. (A non-Jacksonian Democrat from Virginia,
Tyler was the Whig nominee for Vice President in 1840 on the ticket with General William Henry
Harrison, who died one month after his inauguration. Tyler's administration was cursed by party and
intra-party conflict.) Nelson, who came from Hebron, in upstate New York, attended Middlebury
College, and apprenticed and was admitted to the New York bar in 1817, had a successful commercial
and admiralty practice in New York City. He entered politics in the early days of his career and served
as a delegate to the New York Constitutional Convention in 1821. In 1831, he was appointed an Associate
Justice of the New York Supreme Court (a trial court), and became its Chief Justice in 1836. A
Jacksonian Democrat, he was easily confirmed by the Democratic-majority senate in 1845, five days
before Tyler left office.
Justice Nelson wrote the Court's opinion in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
170 (1855), which imposed the equal division of damages rule in both to blame collisions until displaced
by United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 1975 AMC 541 (1975). He dissented in The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), because he required a congressional declaration of war to
justify the blockade of confederate ports. He wrote the majority opinion in The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 20 (1866), restating the principle that both the commission and the consummation of a maritime
tort must occur on navigable waters, a doctrine set aside in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 1973 AMC 1 (1972).
4947 U.S. at 390. Justice Nelson framed the issue as follows:
The general liability of the carrier, independently of any special agreement, is familiar. He is
chargeable as an insurer of the goods, and accountable for any damage or loss that may happen to
them in the course of the conveyance, unless arising from inevitable accident,-in other words, the
act of God or the public enemy. The liability of the respondents, therefore, would be undoubted,
were it not for the special agreement under which the goods were shipped.
The question is, to what extent has this agreement qualified the common law liability?
[Blut admitting the right thus to restrict his obligation, it by no means follows that he can do so
by any act of his own ... he should not be permitted to exonerate himself without the assent of the
parties concerned. And this is not to be implied or inferred from a general notice to the public,
limiting his obligation, which may or may not be assented to.
Id. at 381-82.
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three years later Congress reacted 50 to the outcry by enacting the Fire
Statute 51 and the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act.52 While these
statutes relieved some carrier distress so that the American merchant marine
would remain "competitive" with that of Great Britain (as respects non-
liability), the basic proposition of the "insurer" liability of common carriers
for negligent damage to cargo remained. Clark v. Barnwel 53 and the
Propeller Niagara54 did not alter the Lexington's principles, and the
strategic position of shippers in America was strengthened by the admiralty
remedy of arrest of the vessel for cargo damage approved in Bulkley v.
Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co.,55 and the joint and several liability provisions
of The Alabama56 and The Atlas.57
The American flag merchant fleet was devastated by the Civil War
(1861-65). 58 Further, American owners were slow to invest in modern
steam-driven iron ships. On the other hand, Great Britain's merchant fleet,
supported by the Royal Navy, ruled the waves, while British carriers avoided
liability for cargo damage by their broad exculpatory clauses 59 enforced by
British courts on the theory of "liberty of contract." 60 Furthermore, excul-
50G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 818-22 (2d ed. 1975); Donovan, The Origins and
Development of Limitation of Shipowners' Liability, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 999, 1016-17 (1979).
5
'Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, § 2, 9 Stat. 635, now codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 182.52 Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, §§ 3 and 4, 9 Stat. 635, now codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 183-188.
5353 U.S. (12 How.) 272 (1851), a 7-2 decision written by Justice Nelson, with dissents by Chief
Justice Taney and Justice Wayne.
The Court held that the carrier has the burden of proving that the cause of the damage was an excepted
clause in the bill of lading-here "dangers of the seas." Nevertheless, the shipper may win its case by
going forward with proof of negligence. "But if it can be shown that it might have been avoided by the
use of proper precautionary measures, and that the usual and customary methods for this purpose have
been neglected, they may still be held liable." Id. at 282.54 See supra note 39. On a November voyage from Buffalo to Chicago, a steam vessel went aground
and became frozen in ice and abandoned by the crew from December 3, 1854 to April 27, 1855. In a
unanimous opinion by Justice Clifford, the carrier was held liable under the general maritime law, the
Court noting:
Common carriers by water, like common carriers by land, in the absence of any legislative
provisions describing a different rule, are also, in general, insurers, and liable in all events, and for
every loss or damage, however occasioned, unless it happened by the act of God, or the public
enemy, or by some other cause or accident, without any fault or negligence on the part of the
carrier, and expressly excepted in the bill of lading.
62 U.S. at 22.
5565 U.S. (24 How.) 386 (1860).
5692 U.S. (2 Otto) 695 (1875).
5793 U.S. (3 Otto) 302 (1876).
58See generally S. Bernath, Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and
Diplomacy (1970); Hutchins, supra note 27, at 44-50; Albion & Pope, supra note 32, at 148-73.59See generally Yiannopoulos, Bills of Lading and the Conflict of Laws: Validity of Negligence
Clauses in England, 37 Det. L.J. 99 (1959).
6°See, e.g., Tattersall v. National Steamship Co., 12 Q.B. Div. 297 (1884), and In re Missouri S.S. Co.,
42 Ch. Div. 321 (1889).
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patory clauses were joined to a choice of law clause, selecting English law,
and a forum selection clause, requiring disputes to be heard before English
courts. 6' The impact of these clauses on American shippers was devastating
because at least half of all vessels in international trade were British flag62
and the United States flag merchant marine was in serious decline, despite
congressional assistance in the form of lucrative subsidies for carrying
mail.
6 3
These developments occurred while British shipowners organized for
defense and aggression. In 1874 the first modern P & I club, the Steamship
Owners' Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, was organized, and
in 1875 the classic shipowner cartel, the Calcutta Steam Traffic Conference,
was created.64 In 1890 the Shipping Federation, an organization of ship-
owner employers, was created to combat seamen's unions, especially efforts
to enforce the "closed shop" on vessels.65
These threads of unified actions by carriers and their insurers would come
together in an 1882 meeting of the International Law Association (ILA) at
Liverpool that negotiated and produced the Conference Form Model Bill of
Lading.6 6 The purpose of this document, to be adopted voluntarily by all
shipowners (although required by their insurers), was the elimination of
different standards and amounts of liability to shippers as an element of
competition between carers.
There was public reaction, at least among shipper interests, to the
dominance of British shipping and British law, 67 leading to American
congressional action-the 1893 Harter Act-following the Supreme Court's
landmark opinion in Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix
Insurance Co., 68 in which it was held that exculpatory clauses in bills of
611d.
62See D. Howarth, Sovereign of the Seas: The Story of Britain and the Sea 33 (1974) (estimating that
the British merchant flag controlled 52% of world shipping in 1900).63Subsidization of Atlantic shipping services by contracts for the carriage of mail was very common
in France, Germany, and Great Britain. The United States provided such subsidies beginning in 1845. See
further McKee, The Ship Subsidy Question in American Politics, in Smith College Studies in History
VIII (1922).
64See generally N. Singh & R. Colinvaux, Shipowners 96-112, 208-28 (1967).65See generally H. Levinson et al., Collective Bargaining and Technological Change in American
Transportation 274-303 (1971).
66See A. Knauth, The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading 118-31 (4th ed. 1953).67H.R. Rep. No. 1988, 52d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1892). See also H.R. Rep. No. 342, 46th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1881); H.R. Rep. No. 1665, 48th Cong., Ist Sess. (1884); H.R. Rep. No. 1210, 51st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1884). The carriage of U.S. foreign trade in American flag ships declined from about 67% in 1859 to
about 38% in 1870. See Hutchins, supra note 27, at 323-24. By 1910, American flag participation was
just 10%. See R. Morris, Encyclopedia of American History 489 (lst ed. 1953).
68129 U.S. 397 (1889) (a unanimous (7-0) opinion written by Justice Gray). On a voyage from New
York to Liverpool on the British ship Montana, the cargo was lost when the vessel grounded near
Holyhead, Wales. The cargo insurer sued due to the negligence of the carrier's servants; the carrier
Vol. 30, No. 4
lading denying recovery for damage to cargo owners violated public
policy.
6 9
B. The Harter Act (1893)
The direct predecessor of COGSA was the 1893 Harter Act,70 which has
never been repealed or even amended. That statute has a unique position in
maritime history as it was the first regulation by government of the
apportionment of risks between cargo owning interests and ship owning
interests. As such it was the spark that led to the 1924 Hague Rules Treaty,
7
'
on which COGSA is based.
The bill that would become the Harter Act 72 dealt with the prohibition of
exculpatory clauses in bills of lading as "some protection as against foreign
shipowners. ' '73 That protection was the prohibition of clauses relieving
carriers of liability for negligence or lessening the obligation to furnish a
seaworthy vessel,74 but two new carrier defenses-negligent navigation (or
nautical fault) and negligent management-were created by Congress.75
Unfortunately, the record is lamentably void as to the bargaining that
defended on the basis of a bill of lading clause exempting it from "negligence, default, or error in
judgment of the master, mariners, engineers, or others of the crew .. " Id. at 438.
Horace Gray (1828-1902) was born in Boston, studied law at Harvard University, and was admitted
to the Massachusetts bar in 1851. He was appointed an Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court
in 1864, having served as Reporter of that court's decisions for eight years. In 1873, he became Chief
Justice of Massachusetts (Louis D. Brandeis was one of his clerks in 1879-81). President Chester A.
Arthur appointed him to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1882. His nomination, confirmation, and installation
took place within a three week period. He is chiefly remembered for his decision extending Fourteenth
Amendment citizenship to children born in the United States of Chinese laborers imported to work on the
California railroads but ineligible for citizenship by statute. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169
U.S. 649 (1898).
In Liverpool & Great Western, he wrote:
But the ordinary contract of a carrier does involve an obligation on his part to use due care and skill
in navigating the vessel and carrying the goods; and, as is everywhere held, an exception, in the bill
of lading, of perils of the sea or other specified perils does not excuse him from that obligation, or
exempt him from liability for loss or damage from one of those perils to which the negligence of
himself or his servants has contributed.
129 U.S. at 438.
'91d. at 441 ("It being against the policy of the law to allow stipulations which will relieve [it] from
the exercise of care or diligence, or which, in other words, will excuse it for negligence in the
performance of its duty, the company remains liable for such negligence.").70See supra note 36.
71See supra note 3.
72H.R. 9176, 52d Cong., 2d Sess. (1892). The bill prepared by Congressman Harter (D-Ohio) is found
in 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190 and 191.73See Sweeney, Happy Birthday, Harter: A Reappraisal of the Harter Act on its 100th Anniversary,
24 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1, 10 n.42 (1993) [hereinafter cited as Birthday].
7446 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-191.
7546 U.S.C. app. § 192. See Birthday, supra note 73, at 10-12.
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produced these policy-based defenses in unreported committee hearings and
unrecorded proceedings in the House and Senate.
Nevertheless, interpretation of the Harter Act has been remarkably
consistent. In its first Harter Act decision, the Supreme Court saw the statute
as remedial legislation enacted to limit the effect of carrier exculpatory
clauses. 76 In the words of Justice Brown, 77 "the evil to be remedied being
one produced by the oppressive clauses forced upon the shippers of goods by
the vessel owners. '78 This analysis by an experienced admiralty judge
supplements the scanty congressional record79 and helps to discern the
meaning of the Halter Act.
76The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459 (1896). This case of first impression involved a daylight collision
between a steamship in ballast and a tug in a crossing situation in a dredged channel at the entrance to
New York harbor. The tug sank; the steamship was in sole fault as the burdened (or giving way) vessel.
Nevertheless, the steamer argued that it could not be held at fault because, under the Harter Act, the
steamer's owners had exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy before the collision caused by
negligent navigation. The steamship's argument came from a literal reading of the statute. The
unanimous opinion of the Court rejected this reading:
It is entirely clear, however, that the whole object of the act is to modify the relations previously
existing between the vessel and her cargo. This is apparent not only from the title of the act, but
from its general tenor and provisions, which are evidently designed to fix the relations between the
cargo and the vessel, and to prohibit contracts restricting the liability of the vessel and owners in
certain particulars connected with the construction, repair, and outfit of the vessel, and the care and
delivery of the cargo. The act was an outgrowth of attempts, made in recent years, to limit, as far
as possible, the liability of the vessel and her owners, by inserting in bills of lading stipulations
against losses arising from unseaworthiness, bad stowage and negligence in navigation, and other
forms of liability which had been held by the courts of England, if not of this country, to be valid
as contracts and to be respected even when they exempted the ship from the consequences of her
own negligence. As decisions were made by the courts from time to time, holding the vessel for
non-excepted liabilities, new clauses were inserted in the bills of lading to meet these decisions
until the common-law responsibility of carriers by sea had been frittered away to such an extent that
several of the leading commercial associations, both in this country and in England, had taken the
subject in hand, and suggested amendments to the maritime law in line with those embodied in the
Harter act.
Id. at 471-72.
77Henry B. Brown (1836-1913), born in South Lee, Massachusetts, attended Yale University and
read law prior to moving to Detroit in 1859, where he established a flourishing admiralty practice. In
1875, he was appointed United States District Judge for Eastern Michigan. He was elevated to the U.S.
Supreme Court by President Benjamin Harrison in 1890. His nomination, confirmation, and installation
took less than two weeks. While praised for his admiralty opinions, he has come to be vilified in modem
times for writing the majority opinion on racial segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
and for his concurrence in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). He retired in 1905.
"8161 U.S. at 474.
7924 Cong. Rec. 1180 (1893). See also United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236, 1952
AMC 659 (1952) (discussed infra notes 204-37 and accompanying text); Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293
U.S. 296, 1934 AMC 1573 (1934); May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt A.G. (The Isis), 290
U.S. 333, 1933 AMC 1565 (1933); The Germanic, 196 U.S. 589 (1905); Isthmian S.S. Co. v. California
Spray-Chem. Corp., 300 F.2d 41, 1962 AMC 1474 (9th Cir. 1962); The Willdomino, 300 F. 5, 1924
AMC 889 (3d Cir. 1924), cert. dismissed, 270 U.S. 641 (1926); Green, The Harter Act, 16 Harv. L. Rev.
153 (1904).
C. From the Harter Act to the Hague Rules (1908-1924)
Early efforts in the Comit6 Maritime International (CMI) 80 to deal with
the apportionment of the risks of cargo damage were begun in 1908, shortly
before the successful diplomatic conference on collision and salvage in
1910,81 but these efforts were interrupted by the First World War. Never-
theless, three "shipper" colonies, about to become independent dominions-
New Zealand, 82 Australia, 83 and Canada, 84-had enacted "Harter-type"
legislation governing outward shipments, although shipment of manufac-
tured goods into these dominions from Britain was not affected.
Agitation for empire-wide legislation to forestall further national legisla-
tion led to the 1921 Recommendation by the British Imperial Conference for
imperial legislation. At approximately the same time, the Maritime Law
Committee of the ILA began to formulate model rules on bills of lading for
voluntary adoption by shipowners and cargo owners. 85
The "imperial" draft won the unanimous approval of the ILA at its
September 1921 conference at the Hague, Netherlands (hence the name,
Hague Rules). 86 The CMI resumed its work of unifying maritime law in July
1921, but made no proposals to amend the draft ILA Rules, noting however
that it would be ready to consider, "Subsequent international action on
diplomatic lines."'87
The CMI meeting followed the June 1921 founding meeting of the
80 The CMI was organized by national groups of maritime lawyers in 1897. In its early years it
conducted studies of maritime problems and drafted international conventions for diplomatic conferences
convened by the Belgian government; 13 of these were held from 1910-79. Since 1972, it has worked
closely with the International Maritime Organization and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development. For a further look at the history of the CMI, see generally A. Lilar & C. Van Den Bosch,
Le Comitd Maritime Internationale (1972).
81The 1910 conference produced the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of
Law with Respect to Collisions Between Vessels, Brussels, Sept. 23, 1910, reprinted at 6 Benedict on
Admiralty, Doc. No. 3-2 (7th rev. ed. 1999), and the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of
Law Relating to Assistance and Salvage at Sea, Brussels, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658, T.S. No. 576,
reprinted at 6 Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 4-1 (7th rev. ed. 1999).
The United States is not a party to the Collisions Convention. Although it became a party to the
Salvage Convention, this treaty has been replaced by the International Convention on Salvage, London,
Apr. 28, 1989, reprinted at 6 Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 4-2A (7th rev. ed. 1999).
82(1903) Acts No. 96, superseded by (1908) Acts. No. 178 and by (1940) Acts. No. 31. New Zealand
achieved dominion (as opposed to colony) status in 1907.
83Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 3 Commonwealth Acts 37 (1904), superseded by Sea Carriage of Goods
Act, Acts of 1924 No. 22. The Commonwealth of Australia was created from six colonies in 1901.
849 & 10 Edw. 7, ch. 61 (1910), R.S. Canada, ch. 207 (1927), superseded by Water Carriage of Goods
Act, 2 Edw. 8, ch. 49 (1936). Canada became a confederation in 1867 when four colonies were joined
by the British North America Act.
85COGSA History, supra note 6, at 18-25.861d. See also Knauth, supra note 66, at 124-27. Imperial restraints on the actions of dominion
parliaments were entirely removed by the 1931 Statute of Westminster, 22 Geo. 5, ch. 4.
87See COGSA History, supra note 6, at 25-26.
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International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), whose Bill of Lading Commit-
tee, under Charles S. Haight of New York City,88 supported the ILA draft.89
With all the positive endorsements of groups where shipowners were
prominent, if not predominant, it might be expected that cargo owners'
reactions would be uniformly negative, but this was not the case, and there
was no unified opposition of cargo interests to the 1921 ILA Hague rules,
nor to the minor revisions by the CMI in 1922 and 1923.90
The Chairman of the CMI study group (sous-commission) was an
American judge, Charles M. Hough of the Second Circuit, who was also
President of the Maritime Law Association of the United States (MLA). No
major changes were made at the formal Diplomatic Conference at Brussels
in August 1924 that was called to transform the voluntary rules of 1921 into
the mandatory provisions of the 1924 treaty. 91 Aside from the Belgian
delegation made up of the officers of the CMI, most delegations consisted of
embassy personnel stationed in Brussels. Obviously, no debates or amend-
ments were envisaged.
D. The Hague Rules Treaty (1924)
The heart of the treaty is Article 4, the catalog of defenses, a triumph of
English legal drafting as it incorporates most exculpatory clauses, but the
despair of lawyers trained in continental civil law systems. Unlike the
situation of last-minute compromise and hasty drafting in the 1893 Harter
Act,92 the Hague Rules had been carefully considered and approved by the
best minds of that post-war era. The flaw, however, was the very catholicity
of the Article 4 catalog, including every exculpatory clause then current in
the maritime industry. In other words, many of the exculpatory clauses that
American shippers considered to have been nullified by the Harter Act
reemerged as part of the new treaty. In light of the changes in technology,
8 Charles S. Haight (1870-1938) earned his A.B. from Yale University (1892) and his LL.B. from
Harvard University (1895). He was from New Lebanon, New York, where he founded the New Lebanon
School for Boys. He began practicing admiralty law in 1896 and was the senior partner of Haight, Griffin,
Deming & Gardner. He had a longstanding relationship with Scandinavian shipowners and their insurers
and was a founder of the American Scandinavian Foundation. His work on behalf of the shipping
interests of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in the First World War was honored by decorations from
those nations. He was a member of the Executive Committee of the Maritime Law Association of the
United States in 1929-30. He was also a Director of the American Bureau of Shipping, the Maritime
Association of the Port of New York, and the Seaman's Church Institute. For his essential contributions
to COGSA, see infra notes 160-80 and accompanying text.
89Knauth, supra note 66, at 125-28; COGSA History, supra note 6, at 25-26.
901d.
91See R. Colinvaux, The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, 1-9 (1954). See also Knauth, supra
note 66, and COGSA History, supra note 6.92See Birthday, supra note 73, at 9-13.
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economics, and politics since 1921, even its most ardent supporters no
longer consider the Hague Rules to be a model of careful drafting.
The treaty is essentially a two-article document: Article 3 on Carrier
Duties and Article 4 on Carrier Rights and Immunities. Nevertheless, the
carrier responsibilities of Article 3 are subject to the defenses of Article 4.93
It should be inserted here that Congress deliberately deleted that provision of
Article 3 subjecting carrier responsibilities to the Article 4 defenses; 94
accordingly, case law under the United States version of the treaty can
seldom be made to conform to decisions in those nations that adopted the
treaty without any reservations or understandings.
The Hague Rules of 1924, together with its protocols of 196895 and
1979,96 are often referred to as carrier liability treaties, but in truth they are
carrier non-liability treaties. Article 3 contains such disparate subjects as the
carrier's duty to use due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, 97 issuance
of bills of lading,98 the evidentiary consequences of the bill of lading,99
shipper guarantees, l°° cargo's obligation to give notice of loss,10t shipped
bills of lading, 10 2 and prohibition of carrier exculpatory clauses lessening
liability under the treaty, specifically listing benefit of insurance clauses. 10 3
Article 4 also contains a number of differing subjects, such as the burden
of proof on unseaworthiness, 1°4 shipper liability for fault, 10 5 the catalog of
17 defenses, 106 a new provision dealing with the consequences of unreason-
9 3Hague Rules, supra note 3, at art. 3(2) ("Subject to the provisions of Article 4 the carrier shall
properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried."). See
Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd., [1959] A.C. 589 (P.C.).
9446 U.S.C. app. § 1303(2).95The 1968 Visby Amendments to the 1924 Hague Rules are contained in the Protocol to Amend the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading,
Brussels, Feb. 23, 1968, reprinted at 6 Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 1-2 (7th rev. ed. 1999).
96The 1979 SDR amendment to the gold value is contained in the Protocol Amending the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading,
Brussels, Dec. 21, 1979, reprinted at 6 Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 1-2A (7th rev. ed. 1999). The
1968 and 1979 protocols were prepared in both French and English official texts.
97Art. 3, § 1.
98Id. § 3.
9Id. § 4.
'o°Id. § 5.
'
11d. § 6. COGSA provides additionally that failure to give notice does not effect the time bar. See
46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(6).
'
0 2Art. 3, § 7.
1031d. § 8.
104Art. 4, § 1.
10 51d. § 3.
'6Id. § 2(a)-(q). COGSA alters the strike provision and the q clause. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 1304(2) 0 ) and (q).
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able deviation, 10 7 the package or unit limitation of liability (IO sterling in
gold),' 0 8 and the treatment of dangerous cargo.' 09
Crucial substantive provisions are not found in these substantive articles
but are disguised in the definitions of Article 1: the nature of the carrier
(owner or charterer),110 necessity for a physical document, " ' I exclusions of
deck cargo and live animals, 1 2 and the voyage limit of carrier responsibility
(the tackle to tackle rule), despite the fact that the goods are in the actual
"charge" or custody of the carrier. 113 Civil law trained lawyers decry these
non-definitions and blame Anglo-Saxon habits of over-inclusive drafting.
The treaty does not incorporate all leading decisions allocating risks of cargo
damage (especially those of the United States Supreme Court), but does
accommodate almost all carrier views, especially bill of lading clauses
exculpating carrier liability.
The unsystematic and even haphazard drafting of the Hague Rules came
just after the once vibrant industry had suffered wartime destruction from
submarines; at the same time, there was reckless over-expansion in ship
building. By 1924, the industry was suffering from depression, labor
troubles, and reckless competition, and therefore desperately needed protec-
tion.' 14
These troubles of the maritime industry contrast with the situation of the
international air transport industry, which did not even exist at the time its
basic treaty, the Warsaw Convention of 1929,' 15 was prepared. Because it
was drafted out of theory rather than harsh business competition, the
Warsaw Convention contains an orderly progression of ideas that has served
as the model for a number of other treaties dealing with international
transport. 116
"°
7Art. 4, § 4. COGSA provides that deviation to load or unload cargo or passengers is unreasonable.
See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(4).
l"Art. 4, § 5. COGSA revises the entire provision and inserts new language on packagable goods and
customary freight units. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5).
'0Art. 4, § 6.
"°Art. 1(a).
"'id. (b). See also art. 5 excluding charter parties generally.
"
2 Art. 1(c).
131d. (e). Cf. Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-191.
n4G. Mangone, Marine Policy for America 81-87 (1977); S. Lawrence, United States Merchant
Shipping Policies and Politics (1966).
l"5See supra note 5.
116See, e.g., International Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road
(CMR) Geneva, May 19, 1956, 399 U.N.T.S. 190 (U.S. not a party); United Nations Convention on the
Carriage of Goods by Sea, Hamburg, Mar. 31, 1978, UN Doc. A/CONF. 89/14 (1978), entered into force
Nov. 1, 1992, reprinted at 6 Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 1-3 (7th rev. ed. 1999) (U.S. a signatory);
United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, Geneva, May 24, 1980,
U.N. Doc. TD/MT/CONF. 17 (1980), reprinted at Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 1-4 (convention not
yet in force); United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in
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V
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON COGSA
A. Organizational and Historical Background of the 74th Congress
(1935-1937)
The 74th Congress was elected on November 6, 1934, while the United
States was still struggling to recover from the Great Depression that had
overlaid the nation since the great panic of October 29, 1929.1t7 On
November 8, 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt had been elected president and his
party again controlled Congress. In the election of 1934, Democratic
strength in the Senate increased from 60 to 69 seats, with 26 Republicans
and one Farmer-Labor Party member. In the House of Representatives, the
increase was from 310 to 319 Democrats; 108 Republicans and five
Farmer-Labor Party candidates also were elected. 118 The Congress that
assembled on January 3, 1935, was the first since the ratification of the
Twentieth Amendment, 119 which had ended the unsatisfactory practice of
the past whereby a lapse of 13 months intervened between election day and
the first meeting of the newly-elected Congress.
In his State of the Union message on January 4, 1935, President Roosevelt
spoke optimistically to the new congress about his program of social reform:
social security for the aged, unemployment insurance for workers, public
employment for the chronically unemployed, and slum clearance.' 20 The
International Trade (OTT), Vienna, Apr. 19, 1991, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 152/13, reprinted at 6 Benedict
on Admiralty, Doc. No. 1-7 (7th rev. ed. 1999) (convention not yet in force). Equally authentic texts of
the Carriage of Goods, Multimodal Transport, and OTT Conventions were prepared in Arabic, Chinese,
English, French, Russian, and Spanish.
lt7See J. Galbraith, The Great Crash of 1929, 93-132 (3d ed. 1972). See also F. Allen, Only
Yesterday: An Informal History of the Nineteen-Twenties 320 (1931). On "Black Tuesday," October 29,
1929, the stock market recorded 16,410,030 sales, three times the number then considered to be a record.
11 'See Election of 1932, in 2 History of American Presidential Elections 1789-1968 (A. Schlesinger,
Jr. & F. Israel eds. 1971).
"l9The Twentieth Amendment (nicknamed the "Lame Duck Amendment") remedied the situation
whereby those defeated in even-year elections continued to serve until the next congress assembled in
December of the odd years. The amendment by Senator George W. Norris (R-Neb.) was proposed to the
states on March 2, 1932, and declared ratified on February 6, 1933. See further Nagle, A Twentieth
Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 470 (1997).
1204 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 15 (S. Rosenman ed. 1938).
None of the background biographies of FDR deal specifically with maritime policy. The background
of general economic collapse is discussed in the following works: J. Bums, Roosevelt: The Lion and The
Fox (1956); R. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (1979); K.
Davis, FDR (1971-93); F. Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny (1990); W.
Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and The New Deal, 1932-1940 (1963); R. Moley, The First New
Deal (1966); T. Morgan, FDR: A Biography (1985); S. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (1952); A.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt (1957-60); R. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1957).
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legislative product of the 74th Congress on social issues was to be truly
remarkable.12 '
The reform of maritime law on carrier liability was not part of the
president's program. Moreover, the issues in COGSA both then and now
have never been part of the political struggle between the parties. Nonethe-
less, in the realm of transportation, the 74th Congress passed COGSA, 122 the
"Sirovich" amendment to the 1851 Limitation of Liability Act (brought
about by the loss of life in the fire on board the passenger liner Morro
Castle 2 3), and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which established the
United States Maritime Commission. 2 4 The final action on COGSA was
12t Reform legislation of the 74th Congress included, in 1935: Emergency Relief Appropriations Act,
ch. 48, 49 Stat. 115 (to fund the Works Progress Administration, Public Works Administration, and
Civilian Conservation Corps); Rural Electrification Act, ch. 432, 49 Stat. 1363; National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449; Motor Carriers' Act, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543; Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49
Stat. 620; Banking Act, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684; Public Utility Company Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803; Farm
Mortgage Moratorium Act, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 967; Bituminous Coal Stabilization Act, ch. 824, 49 Stat.
991.
The 1936 social agenda included: Bonus Payment Act (World War I), ch. 32, 49 Stat. 1099; Soil
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, ch. 104, 49 Stat. 1151; Robinson-Patman Anti-Price
Discrimination Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526; Walsh-Healy Government Contracts Act, ch. 881, 49 Stat.
2036.
122See supra note 4.
123The S.S. Morro Castle, a Ward Line passenger vessel on service from Havana to New York, caught
fire and burned at sea in hurricane winds off the coast of New Jersey on September 8, 1934. At least 137
lives were lost from the fire or drowning, but 413 were rescued. Efforts to tow the flaming ship were
unsuccessful and she grounded off Asbury Park, New Jersey. Arson was suspected but could not be
proved.
The master had died just before the fire broke out and poison was suspected because of violent labor
troubles, but again this was not proved. Criminal prosecutions of the acting master, chief engineer, and
the corporate owner resulted in convictions, fines, and imprisonment on charges of negligence,
misconduct, and inattention to duty. See United States v. Abbott, 1936 AMC 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). The
officers' convictions were later reversed. See United States v. Abbott, 1937 AMC 533 (2d Cir. 1937).
The shipowner sought limitation of liability, see New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Continental Ins.
Co., 32 F. Supp. 251, 1940 AMC 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), rev'd, 117 F.2d 404, 1941 AMC 243 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 580, 1941 AMC 1010 (1941), but the cases were settled after payments greatly
exceeding the limitation amount were made. See further G. Thomas, Shipwreck: The Strange Fate of the
Morro Castle (1972); T. Gallagher, Fire at Sea-The Story of the Morro Castle (1959); U.S. Gov't,
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Morro Castle and Mohawk Investigations (1937).
The Sirovich Amendment to the 1851 Limitation of Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 662, ch. 521, 49 Stat.
1479, was codified in 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 183-189. It provided a minimum limitation fund of $60 per ton
for personal injury and death claims, nullified exculpatory clauses in passenger contracts, and imposed
a six month limit on the shipowner's right to a concursus of claims. In 1984 the figure of $60 per ton was
increased to $420 per ton. See Pub. L. No. 98-498, § 213, 98 Stat. 2296, 2306.
124Act of June 26, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-835, ch. 858, 49 Stat. 1985, now codified as amended in
scattered sections of 46 U.S.C. app. See M. Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt: The Uneasy Alliance
(1980); J. Bunker, Liberty Ships: Ugly Ducklings of World War 11 (1972); E. Land, Winning the War
with Ships (1952); F. Lane, Ships for Victory: A History of Shipbuilding Under the U.S. Maritime
Commission in World War 11 (1951).
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taken during the week of April 17, 1936,125 the Sirovich Amendment on
June 5, 1936,126 and the Merchant Marine Act on June 26, 1936.127
Nineteen thirty-six was also a presidential election year. The president's
State of the Union message was given before Congress and, contrary to
custom, at night, in order to reach a nationwide radio audience. In it, the
president stressed the need for a strong defense because of threats of
renewed conflict as Hitler rearmed, Mussolini conquered Ethiopia, and
Japan invaded China. A newly invigorated merchant marine would become
a critical component of America's defense.
From 1913-21, Franklin D. Roosevelt had served as Assistant Secretary
of the Navy in the administration of President Woodrow Wilson. In that post
he became very much aware of the peril to United States foreign trade before
America's entry into the First World War, when the decline of the United
States flag merchant fleet and the resulting reliance on British flag carriers
had put America's foreign trade at the mercy of German submarine warfare
and the requirements of the British war effort. 128 Roosevelt's wartime
experience was shared by many in his administration as well as members of
Congress, thus the merchant marine as an element of national defense would
seem natural to them.
A worldwide depression in ocean shipping followed the First World War
so that the industry was engaged in cut-throat competition, destructive of
proper maintenance, and leading to confrontational labor relations from
1922-36. President Roosevelt strongly supported the 1936 Merchant Marine
Act and soon moved his top troubleshooter, Joseph P. Kennedy, from the
Securities and Exchange Commission to the new Maritime Administration
created by the 1936 Act. However, Kennedy lusted for the appointment as
Ambassador to the United Kingdom, the most prestigious ambassadorship at
the time, but rumors of its expected availability did not materialize; thus,
Kennedy reluctantly accepted the new maritime assignment in February
1937. A year later, however, he resigned to become United States Ambas-
sador to the Court of St. James's. 29
The Roosevelt Administration proposed a new policy to provide direct
125See I Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 600; 80 Cong. Rec. 5026 (1936) (House) and 80 Cong. Rec. 5070
(1936) (Senate).
126See supra note 123.
127See generally Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 573-76, 1980 AMC 15
(1980). See also Hutchins, supra note 27; Lawrence, supra note 114; Albion & Pope, supra note 32,
especially chs. I-V on U.S. maritime policy from 1914-59.
128See Safford, The American Merchant Marine as an Expression of Foreign Policy: Woodrow
Wilson and the Genesis of Modem Maritime Diplomacy, in The Atlantic World of Robert B. Albion
144-68 (B. Labaree ed. 1975).
129Beschloss, supra note 124.
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subsidization of a vast new American fleet of modem cargo vessels 30 rather
than the indirect subsidies favored by European and Japanese owners. 13'
Another reason for the new policy was the collapse of the earlier policy of
subsidization through contracts to carry the United States mails; Senator
(later U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Black's investigation revealed vast
corruption and scandalous waste and inefficiency, thus making renewal of
the subsidy system politically impossible in the depression atmosphere. 32
There were three essential elements to the new policy:
1. The United States must have an adequate fleet to carry all of its domestic
waterborne commerce and an adequate fleet to carry a substantial portion of its
foreign trade on essential trade routes.
2. The United States flag merchant fleet must serve as a naval auxiliary in
war or times of national emergency.
3. These fleets (domestic and foreign) must be composed of the best-
equipped, safest, and most suitable vessels, constructed in the United States
and owned and operated under the United States flag. 133
To accommodate these goals, there would be a vessel construction
subsidy (CDS) whereby the government would provide up to 55% of the
cost of construction of new ships in United States shipyards. 134 A second
subsidy, the Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS), would pay the difference
between the cost of operations (chiefly labor) under the United States flag
and the cost of foreign flag operations on essential foreign trade routes. ' 35 At
the same time, the United States used its substantial influence in the
130While the 1936 plan called for 500 ships in 10 years, the impact of the Second World War was to
create 5,777 ships in five years. See Lane, supra note 124; Lawrence, supra note 114; P. Zeis, American
Shipping Policy (1938); Morse, Study of American Merchant Marine Legislation, 25 L. & Contemp.
Prob. 57 (1960).
13t See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Mar Ad Report, Maritime Subsidies (1971); Mangone, supra note
114.
132See Hearings Before Special Senate Committee to Investigate Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts,
73d Cong., 2d Sess (1933) (The Black Committee Report).
133See supra notes 124 and 130.
134The 1981 federal budget eliminated all funding for the CDS and proclaimed a moratorium on ODS
contracts. As a result, the few American shipyards still left now concentrate on Defense Department
contracts and the coastwise or cabotage fleet, which is protected from foreign flag competition.
135See Whitehurst, The Merchant Marine Act of 1936: An Operational Subsidy in Retrospect, 8 J.L.
& Econ. 223 (1965). The "essential foreign trade routes" requirement was removed in 1971 and the
subsidy was made available to tramp shipping (in addition to liner shipping) in 1970. See G. Jantscher,
Bread Upon the Waters: Federal Aids to the Maritime Industries (1975); Lawrence, supra note 114;
Blackwell, Implementation of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, 5 J. Mar. L. & Com. 167 (1974);
Diebold, Shipping in the Immediate Postwar Years, 53 J. Pol. Econ. 15 (1945).
ODS has been replaced by the Maritime Security Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-239, 110 Stat. 3118,
whereby militarily useful ships can receive an operating subsidy for 10 years. Forty-seven ships owned
by 17 companies received this subsidy in 1999. See Pouch, The U.S. Merchant Marine and Maritime
Industry, in Review, 125 U.S. Naval Inst. Proc. 104-11 (May 1999).
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International Labour Organization (ILO) to improve the working conditions,
health, safety, wages, and hours of seamen throughout the world. 36
Thus, the 1936 Congress provided for the carriage of American foreign
trade in new United States vessels under a regime of carrier liability that,
because of agreement between shippers and carriers, had the appearance of
fairness both to carriers and their insurers and also to cargo owners and their
insurers. Congress, however, did not forbid or restrict the use of third
country carriers for American foreign trade, as it might have done. Arguably,
Congress could not have foreseen that United States flag vessels would
eventually be carrying less than 3% of our foreign trade.' 37 In 1999, much
of the unrepealed Merchant Marine Act of 1936 is a dead letter.' 38
The presidential election of 1936 tested the actions of the First New Deal,
and the outcome was favorable. 139 It was also the year when fringe group
fanatics were noticed, although they did not affect the outcome,140 and it was
the year when the infant science of political forecasting was undone by
reliance on the telephone, 14' which was not yet the ordinary means of
communication because of its relatively high cost.
136Ihe ILO was created in 1919 by the peace treaties that also created the League of Nations, as an
autonomous organization within the League system. See D. Morse, The Origin and Evolution of the ILO
and its Role in the World Community (1969). The United States became a member in 1934. The
organization continued at its Geneva headquarters following creation of the United Nations, becoming a
specialized agency under art. 57 of the U.N. Charter.
Although five important maritime conventions were completed before the United States became a
member of the ILO, American participation was vitally important in securing the 1936 Convention on the
Liability of Shipowners in Case of Sickness, Injury or Death of Seamen, 54 Stat. 1693, T.S. No 951, 40
U.N.T.S. 169. Other projects pushed through with the help of the United States included Accommodation
of Crews (1946), Annual Holidays with Pay (1936), Convention on Sickness Insurance for Seamen
(1936), Food and Catering (Ships' Crews) (1946), and Hours of Work on Shipboard (1936).
137U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Mar Ad, Merchant Fleets of the World (1970). See also Mangone, supra
note 114, and Pouch, supra note 135.
138The Maritime Subsidies Programs have been repealed despite statutory language requiring the
United States to have an adequate fleet to carry all of its domestic waterborne commerce and an adequate
fleet to carry a substantial portion of its foreign trade.
139 See Schlesinger & Israel, supra note 118, at "Election of 1936." The Second New Deal, 1937-45,
is analyzed in A. Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (1995).
14"See A. Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression (1982).
14'Editors of the Literary Digest were persuaded by their direct-mail ballots and telephone polls that
the Republican candidate, Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas, would triumph in the 1936 presidential
election. They predicted he would capture 32 states with 370 electoral votes. President Roosevelt,
however, gained 60.8% of the popular vote and 523 of the 531 electors-every state except Maine and
Vermont. See Schlesinger & Israel, supra note 118, at "Election of 1936."
The apparent electoral triumph of 1936 would be dissipated in 1937 because of the failure of the
"court-packing" plan. See L. Baker, Back to Back: The Duel Between FDR and the Supreme Court
109-36 (1967), and J. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and The New Deal: The Growth of the
Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-39, 211-49 (1967). In 1938, the Democrats lost 70 seats in the
House and seven in the Senate.
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B. Committee Consideration and Background of S. 1152
The Senate Committee on Commerce in the 74th Congress was made up
of 14 Democrats and 6 Republicans, chaired by Royal S. Copeland of New
York. 142 The majority group was not made up of leaders of the Senate.
Members included Champ Clark of Missouri 43 and Theodore Bilbo of
Mississippi. "44 The minority group, however, was distinguished: Wallace H.
White of Maine, who introduced the COGSA bill;145 Charles McNary of
Oregon; 146 Hiram Johnson of California, 47 who had been a majority
142Royal S. Copeland (1868-1938) received his M.D. from the University of Michigan (1889), where
he was later appointed a professor of ophthalmology (1895-1908). After serving as the Republican mayor
of Ann Arbor, he became Dean of the Flower Hospital Medical College in New York (1908 -18) and
then, as a Democrat, the President of the New York City Board of Health (1918-23). He served as a
United States senator (D-N.Y.) from 1923 until his death in 1938, having been twice re-elected. His initial
nomination was due to the support of the publisher William Randolph Hearst, who had sought the
nomination for himself but was unacceptable to Governor Alfred E. Smith. As Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Copeland led investigations into the conditions of seamen and the shipping
industry. He opposed much of the New Deal, especially the 1937 Supreme Court Packing Plan. His last
campaign was on behalf of Tammany Hall, where he ran unsuccessfully against Mayor Fiorello H. La
Guardia's re-election. He was responsible for much legislation dealing with pure food and drugs.
143Bennett "Champ" Clark (1890-1954) was the son of the legendary Champ Clark (1850-1921),
who had been a member of Congress from Missouri for 26 years and served as Speaker of the House from
1911-19. Senator Clark served as Missouri's senator from 1933-45.
144Theodore G. Bilbo (1877-1947), a white supremacist from Mississippi, served two terms as
Governor (1916 and 1928). In the Senate, where he sat from 1934-47, he was tolerated because he was
a vigorous opponent of Senator (and former governor) Huey (The Kingfish) Long of neighboring
Louisiana.
145Wallace H. White (1877-1952) received his A.B. from Bowdoin College in 1899, studied law at
Columbian University in Washington, D.C., was an assistant clerk to the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, and was admitted to the bar in D.C. in 1902 and in Maine in 1903. He was first elected to
Congress in 1917 and was re-elected six times; he was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1930 and re-elected
in 1936 and 1942. He was chair of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee from 1927-31
and was the U.S. Delegate to the 1929 London Conference on Safety of Life at Sea. He also represented
the United States at international conferences dealing with telecommunications, radio, and telegraphy.
146Charles McNary (1874-1944) attended Stanford University from 1896-98 and was admitted to the
Oregon Bar in 1899. He was first elected to the Senate in 1917, having been a justice of the Oregon
Supreme Court. He was re-elected four times, serving in the Senate for 27 years (1917-44), and was the
Minority Leader of the Senate from 1933-44. He sat out the 1936 election, but in 1940 was Wendell
Wilkie's vice presidential candidate. He made his reputation with farm relief legislation, but in 1924 filed
a bill (S. 3177, 68th Cong., 1 st Sess.) that was responsive to the complaints of shippers in the 1923 Hague
Rules House hearings (see infra note 165). This legislation would also have answered complaints about
some of the significant omissions in the 1893 Harter Act (such as a time bar). No action was taken on
McNary's bill after its referral to the Commerce Committee.147Hiram W. Johnson (1866-1945) attended the University of California from 1884-86, was
admitted to the California bar in 1888, became a reforming prosecutor in San Francisco, and was elected
Governor of California in 1911. He was Theodore Roosevelt's vice presidential choice in the Progressive
(or Bull Moose) Party in 1912. He was re-elected as a progressive governor in 1915, but soon "retired"
to the U.S. Senate, where he became increasingly conservative, serving 28 years (1917-43). Although
frequently mentioned as a possible Supreme Court justice, especially after he sat out the 1936 election
as a Roosevelt Republican, he was never nominated for a seat.
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committee member at the 1927 hearings; 48 and Arthur Vandenberg of
Michigan.149
The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries was made up of
15 Democrats and five Republicans, chaired by Schuyler Otis Bland of
Virginia, t50 who had followed the earlier hearings as a minority member in
1923, 1925, and 1930. Notable majority members were William Sirovich of
New York 15' and Monrad Wallgren of Washington. 52 The congressmen' 53
who had stalled the Hague Rules in 1930 by a numbing, populist cross-
examination of the treaty proponents were missing in 1936.
Two independent processes were at work in the 74th Congress: treaty
approval and statutory enactment. The Senate proceeded to consider the
international treaty on which COGSA is based, 54 eventually giving its
advice and consent to the treaty, 155 although subject to a reservation.' 56 Only
148See infra note 167.
149Arthur Vandenberg (1884-1951), a newspaperman from Grand Rapids, Michigan, became a
Republican State Committeeman and was appointed to the Senate in 1928. Elected and re-elected three
times, he advanced rapidly in the party. Previously an isolationist, in the Second World War he
championed a unified and bipartisan (or non-partisan) foreign policy. He was a delegate to the 1945
founding conference of the United Nations and when the Republicans took the Senate in 1946, he became
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, supporting the United Nations Charter, the Marshall Plan,
and the North Atlantic Treaty.
150 Schuyler Otis Bland (1872-1950) briefly attended the College of William and Mary and was
admitted to the Virginia bar in 1900. He practiced in Newport News until elected to Congress in 1918.
He was re-elected 14 times, serving until 1949.
1SWilliam ]. Sirovich (1882-1939) received his A.B. from the City College of New York in 1902 and
earned an M.D. from Columbia University in 1906. He served as the Superintendent of the Peoples'
Hospital from 1911-29, was nominated for Congress in 1924 but was defeated, and was then elected in
1926 and re-elected six times. He was responsible for the 1936 Amendment to the Limitation of Liability
Act, see supra note 123. He was a strong supporter of the New Deal, a playwright, and a reformer. Nine
years before the Social Security Act, he introduced a bill for federal grants in aid to those states adopting
old age insurance plans; it never emerged from committee.
152Monrad C. Wallgren (1891-1961), an optometrist and army officer in the First World War, entered
politics as a radical congressman in 1932 from the Washington State Commonwealth Federation (similar
to Upton Sinclair's "End Poverty in California"). Re-elected to Congress three times, he was elected to
the Senate in 1940 and served on the Truman Committee investigating wartime defense contracts. He left
the Senate to run successfully for Governor in 1944 but was defeated for re-election in 1948. President
Truman then appointed him to the Federal Power Commission, where he served as Chairman until his
retirement in 1951.
153See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
154See supra note 3.
155See 1 Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 582-86; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3 Leg. Hist., supra
note 6, at 508-21, Ex. Rep. No. 2, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
1563 Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 586; S. Rep. No. 742, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935), 1 Leg. Hist., supra
note 6, at 531-35.
The reservation reads as follows:
[N]otwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, Section 5, and the first paragraph of Article 9 of the
convention, neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable within the
jurisdiction of the United States of America for any loss or damage to or in connection with goods
in an amount exceeding $500.00, lawful money of the United States of America, per package or
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when the Senate had completed its work on the international agreement was
the domestic bill referred to the House of Representatives for legislative
action. 157
The remarkable feature of this legislation in both houses of Congress is
the minimal amount of debate and its passage without recorded votes. In that
sense it resembles the passage of the Harter Act in 1893.158 These examples
prove the proposition that agreement within the maritime industry is
essential before Congress will act. Congressional intent in COGSA, if any,
would have to emerge from the Committees of the Senate and House, but
even there the legislation would not bear the imprint of any single powerful
individual; nor are there traces of presidential pressure on Congress.
The Hague Rules treaty had been sent to the Senate by President Calvin
Coolidge for advice and consent nine years before on February 26, 1927.159
Hearings were held on the submitted treaty in a desultory fashion in 1927
and 1930, but the Hague Rules treaty (and domestic legislation) were not
given serious consideration in Congress, despite the best efforts of Ameri-
ca's foremost admiralty lawyers to hasten the process. 160 The final form of
the domestic legislation reflected textual compromises achieved in 1930-31
between those representing ship owners (and their insurers) and those
representing cargo owners (and their insurers). 161 The specialists worked out
an agreement they could all live with, and Congress later accepted and
endorsed their efforts in its own time. 162
Senator White introduced the bill that would become COGSA (S. 1152,
74th Cong., 1st sess.) on January 17, 1935. The compromises of 1930-31
unit unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment
and inserted in the bill of lading....
51 Stat. 260.
1573 Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 594-743; H.R. Rep. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), 1 Leg.
Hist., supra note 6, at 521-29.
158See Birthday, supra note 73, at 10-13.
1591 Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 561; see Exec. E, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1927), and Transmittal Letter
from President Coolidge.
161See S. 1295, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 9, 1927) (introduced by Senator William E. Borah
(R-Idaho)), and International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules in Regard to Bills of
Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings on Executive E Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927), 3 Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 323-64.
Senator White introduced domestic legislation on the Hague Rules to accompany S. 1295 in the 70th
Cong. (H.R. 12208, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 19, 1928)). Thereafter, he reintroduced the bill (with
various alterations) in the 71st (H.R. 3830), 72d (S. 482), and 73d (S. 2598) Congresses.
Hearings were held only in 1930. See Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings on H.R.
3830 Before the House Committee on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1930), 3 Leg.
Hist., supra note 6, at 365-498.
l61See Report of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Conference on Uniform Ocean Bills
of Lading-Hague Rules (Nov. 14, 1930).
162See COGSA History, supra note 6.
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held firm because previous opponents had been coopted into proponents.
The 1935 hearings in the Senate (May 10, 1935) before the Committee on
Commerce, and the 1936 hearings in the House (January 28, 1936) before
the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, were anticlimactic. The
fierce opposition of shippers in the American Meat Packers Institute (AMPI)
and the National Industrial Traffic League (NITL) that had been expressed
in the House in 1923, 1925, and 1930, and in the Senate in 1927, had
dissipated because of the 1930-31 changes in the treaty language negotiated
under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
(CoCUS) with the assistance of the government in the form of the United
States Shipping Board of the Department of Commerce; the result was, in
effect, a package deal. Mr. Haight, 63 representing the ICC as Chairman of
its Bill of Lading Committee, was a key player who could express the views
of shipowners and their insurers in the negotiated compromise. Norman
Draper' 64 of the AMPI could likewise express the views of shippers and
their insurers.
Following sharp but inconclusive confrontations in 1923,165 1925,166 and
1927,167 the organized interest groups reached a compromise in 1931 that
neither group would have accepted willingly except for the fact that
stalemate would continue. Certainly the cargo interests would have preferred
to tighten the Harter Act's restraints on shipowner's defenses and exculpa-
tory clauses. Just as certainly the shipowner interests would have preferred
6 3See supra note 88.
164Norman Draper (1893-1963) was not a lawyer but a public relations and advertising consultant. He
began his career as a reporter for the New York Sun and was then an editor for the New York Journal
and a foreign correspondent for the Associated Press in London and Paris; he was also a war
correspondent with the American Forces in France (1917-19) and at the subsequent Peace Conference
at Paris in 1919. He returned to the United States in 1919 and became the Washington, D.C.
representative of the AMPI (now the American Meat Institute of Arlington, Virginia) and the unofficial
spokesman for American shippers. The AMPI made its opposition to the Hague Rules clear in a 1922
pamphlet entitled "The Hague Rules, 1921 versus The Harter Act." Draper served in Washington until
1940, when he transferred to Chicago to serve as the AMPI's public relations director (where he remained
until 1957). The AMPI was founded in Chicago in 1906 in response to the first federal meat Inspection
Act of 1906, Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3913, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 34 Stat. 674, now codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 601-695, which was enacted following public outrage at the revelations contained in Upton
Sinclair's "The Jungle."
165Hearings Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings Before the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1923), held on Feb. 13-14, 1923, 3 Leg. Hist.,
supra note 6, at 3-122.
166Hearings Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings Before the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925), held on Jan. 28-29, 1925, 3 Leg. Hist.,
supra note 6, at 123-321.
167Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States, Senate,
Relative to Executive E, A Treaty Entitled International Convention for Unification of Certain Rules in
Regard to Bills of Lading for Carriage of Goods by Sea, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927), held on Dec. 22,
1927, 3 Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 323-64.
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continuation of exculpatory clauses under a freedom of contract rationale; if
that could not be attained, they preferred no changes in the text of a treaty
they regarded as already full of compromises.
While agreement in principle had been reached in 1930, the formal
changes in text would not be drafted until 1931. The lengthy 1930
hearings 68 had been extremely frustrating for the commercial lawyers, who
had thought that in the absence of organized opposition the process might be
shortened. They had not counted on congressional grandstanding. Two
minority members of the House Committee 69 vigorously and exhaustively
cross-examined the proponents of the compromise, finally demanding that
the legislation not proceed without a quorum of the committee and the
presence of witnesses from all industries affected by the legislation. 70 Such
hearings were never held in the 71st Congress; nor were hearings on Hague
Rules legislation ever held in the crisis atmosphere of the depression-
afflicted 72nd and 73rd Congresses.
The 1935 Senate hearings,' 7' attended by the Chair (Senator Copeland)
and one minority member (Senator Ernest W. Gibson, R-Vt.), began with
favorable commendations by the Department of State and the Department of
Commerce. Favorable testimony from seven non-governmental witnesses
was also heard; 72 the sole note of discord came from D. Roger Englar, 73
the General Counsel of the American Institute of Marine Underwriters
(AIMU), who sought to amend the bill by a provision outlawing the "both
to blame" collision clause.' 74 His proposal was not accepted then and would
be reintroduced, unsuccessfully, in the next year.
The 1936 House hearings 75 heard favorable testimony from twelve
168Hearings Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings on H.R. 3830 Before the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930), held on Mar. 3-5 and 10,
1930, 3 Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 365-498.
169Ewin L. Davis (D-Tenn.) was defeated for renomination in 1932 after seven terms in Congress. He
was then appointed to the Federal Trade Commission, where he served until his death in 1949. Charles
L. Abernethy (D-N.C.) was defeated for renomination in 1934 after eight terms in Congress. He then
resumed the private practice of law until 1938, when he retired. He died in 1955.
'
7
°See 3 Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 451.
17'Hearing on the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearing on S. 1152 Before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), held on May 10, 1935, 3 Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 499-593.
172Charles S. Haight (ICC); A.B. Barber (CoCUS); Luther M. Walter (NITL); Thomas B. Paton
(American Bankers' Association); Cletus Keating (American Steamship Owners' Association); James
Sinclair (Trans-Atlantic Associated Freight Conference); Arnold W. Knauth (MLA).
173D. Roger Englar (1884-1948) received his A.B. from Western Maryland College in 1903 and his
LL.B. from Harvard University in 1906. He practiced admiralty law with the New York City firm of
Bigham, Englar, Jones & Houston for more than 40 years. Unlike Mr. Haight, he usually represented
cargo owners and insurers.
174See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
175Hearings on Uniform Ocean Bills of Lading: Hearings on S. 1152 Before the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), held on Jan. 28, 1936, 3 Leg. Hist., supra
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witnesses. Again counsel for the AIMU sought to amend the bill to outlaw
the both to blame clause. 176 However, there was agreement that this clause
was outside the basic 1930 compromise and could be put aside. 177 In fact,
the clause would never be outlawed by legislation; in 1952, the Supreme
Court finally rendered the clause unenforceable in its Esso Belgium decision
as a violation of public policy.' 78
The Senate Committees on Commerce and Foreign Relations reported
favorably on the Hague Rules treaty in March 1935,179 some six months
after the Senate's advice and consent to the international convention on air
carrier liability. 80 While the Senate gave its first formal advice and consent
to the Hague Rules on April 1, 1935, subject to a reservation translating the
unit limitation from £100 to $500,18 no action was taken to proclaim
ratification of the treaty until more than two years later, following a second
formal advice and consent that subjected the treaty text to the previously
approved reservation and an "understanding."'' 8 2 While Senate understand-
note 6, at 595-743. In addition to Messrs. Barber, Paton, Haight, and Knauth from the Senate Hearings,
the House heard from Norman Draper (AMPI), N.D. Belnap (NITL), Francis T. Cole (American
Manufacturers' Export Assoc.), Ira A. Campbell (American Steamship Owners' Association), R.C.
Fullbright (American Cotton Shippers' Association), Henry R. Sutphen (Merchants' Association of New
York), H. Ayres (Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York), and C.H. Callahan (Maritime
Association of the Port of New York).
176 See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
177The AIMU did not oppose passage of the bill if its amendment to exclude the clause was
unsuccessful.
178See infra notes 204-37 and accompanying text.
1791 Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 582-86; Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, 3 Leg. Hist.,
supra note 6, at 508-21, Ex. Rep. No. 2, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
18°Advice and consent of the Senate to the French text was obtained without debate or recorded vote
on June 15, 1934. See 78 Cong. Rec. 11,587 (1934). Ratification was proclaimed by the President to be
effective October 29, 1934. See 49 Stat. 3013.
181See supra note 156.
1823 Leg. Hist., supra note 6, at 594-743; H.R. Rep. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), 1 Leg.
Hist., supra note 6, at 521-29.
The understanding simply stated, "that should any conflict arise between the provisions of the
convention and the provisions of the act of April 16, 1936, known as the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
the provisions of said act shall prevail." 51 Stat. 260. This statement is consistent with art. VI of the
Constitution whereby, as between a treaty or a statute, the later in time has priority. See Edye v.
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (later statute accorded priority over an earlier treaty). Cf. Cook v. United
States (The Mazel Tov), 288 U.S. 102 (1933) (later treaty accorded priority over an earlier statute). Thus,
the COGSA statute of April 16, 1936 would have priority domestically over the Hague Rules treaty of
April 1, 1935.
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ings are not the same as formal reservations in international law, 83 the effect
in United States courts is essentially the same. 184
C. Enactment and Presidential Approval
By August 1, 1935, the Senate had finished the domestic maritime
legislation and sent it to the House of Representatives. 185 Senate Report No.
742 is essential to understanding the differences between the Hague Rules
and COGSA. The lower house, however, had different priorities, and it was
not until January 1936 that it held hearings on the bill, subject to a number
of "clarifications" that gave the United States a law on ocean carriage of
goods that would be significantly different from that in force in the other
nations signatory to the Hague Rules. 186
183See generally McRae, The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations, 49 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 155
(1978), and Gamble, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, 74
Am. J. Int'l L. 372 (1980). See also K. Holloway, Modern Trends in Treaty Law: Constitutional Law,
Reservations, and the Three Modes of Legislation (1967), and Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty
Ratification, 77 Am. J. Int'l L. 257 (1983).
i84See Power Auth. of the State of N.Y. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated
as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957). In its advice and consent to the 1950 Saint Lawrence Seaway Treaty with
Canada, the Senate included a reservation that the power resources of the Niagara River could only be
developed by special act of Congress. In 1920, however, both houses of Congress had assigned the
development of power generation in the rivers to the Federal Power Commission (FPC). Canada ignored
the U.S. reservation as it did not affect the international obligation, but New York State challenged plans
of the FPC to develop the power generation of the river. The Court found the alleged "reservation" to be
ineffective as it related solely to domestic concerns and could not alter the earlier legislation by both
houses. (This was decided 26 years before I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the one house
legislation prohibition). There are 16 other reservations to the 1924 treaty: Australia (1955), Cuba (1977),
Denmark (1938), Egypt (1943), France (1937), Ireland (1962), Ivory Coast (1961), Japan (1957), Kuwait
(1969), Nauru (1955), Netherlands (1956), Norway (1938), Papua-New Guinea (1955), Switzerland
(1954), Tanzania (1962), and the United Kingdom (1930).
185Hearing on Uniform Ocean Bills of Lading: Hearings on S. 1152 Before the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), held on Jan. 28, 1936, 3 Leg. Hist., supra
note 6, at 595-743.
186The depth and magnitude of United States variations from the treaty language can be understood
only by a textual analysis of both statute and treaty.
Some of the differences are major:
1) Section 1303(2) of COGSA omits "Subject to the provisions of Article 4."
2) Section 1303(4) adds "Provided, That nothing in this chapter shall be construed as repealing
or limiting the application of any part [of the Pomerene Act on Bills of Lading]."
3) Section 1303(6) adds "Provided, That if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent or
concealed, is not given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right
of the shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the
goods should have been delivered."
4) Section 1304(4) "Deviations" adds "Provided, however, That if the deviation is for the
purpose of loading or unloading cargo or passengers it shall, prima facie, be regarded as
unreasonable."
5) Section 1304(5) COGSA deletes "per package or unit" and replaces it with "per package
lawful money of the United States, or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary
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The "clarified" text was approved by the House of Representatives on
April 6, 1936.187 With the concurrence of both House and Senate Commit-
tees on a unified text, formal reconciliation by a Conference Committee was
not necessary and President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved COGSA on
April 16, 1936, to be effective July 15, 1936.188 Thus, a new regime of
carrier liability by treaty and statute began to be applied to United States
foreign trade. As of 1999, COGSA has not been amended in any respect,
although a bill has been introduced in the Senate to make significant changes
to it.189
After presidential approval of the domestic statute and proclamation of
treaty ratification, the United States Department of State gave two "inter-
pretations" of the textual changes in the treaty language. On June 5, 1937,
there was a Department Memorandum which first listed the changes and
then said:
The foregoing differences from the Convention, made in the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, are intended primarily (1) to clarify provisions in the
Convention which may be of uncertain meaning thereby avoiding expensive
litigation in the United States for purposes of interpretation and (2) to
freight unit." Furthermore, "100 pounds sterling" is deleted and replaced with "$500" and "the
transportation of' is added between "in connection with . . goods" in two places: in the first and
fourth paragraphs. Lastly, the following sentence is added: "In no event shall the carrier be liable
for more than the amount of damage actually sustained."
6) Section 1312 replaces art. 10 of the Hague Rules on the application of the treaty to bills of
lading issued in contracting states. Section 1312 applies the statute to "all contracts for carriage of
goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in foreign trade."
7) Section 1309 adds a provision prohibiting discrimination between competing shippers.
8) Section 1309 also adds a provision for suspension of the statute in retaliation for
discriminatory application of the treaty by foreign nations.
Other differences are minor:
1) Section 1308 substitutes the 1851 United States Limitation of Liability Act and the 1916
Shipping Act.
2) Art. 9 of the Hague Rules is entirely deleted (gold value of sterling and rates of exchange).
3) Section 1311 preserves the Harter Act for the periods "before" and "after" COGSA carriage
in international trade and preserves the Harter Act in domestic trade subject to the "coastwise
option" for application of COGSA.
4) Arts. 11-16, the Final Clauses of the Hague Rules, are entirely deleted.
One difference is inscrutable:
Section 1304(2)0) "Strikes" adds "Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to
relieve a carrier from responsibility for the carrier's own acts."
18780 Cong. Rec. 5220 (Senate) and 5319 (House) (Apr. 9, 1936).
188See supra note 4.
189As of May 1, 1999, the bill, "To revise the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and for other purposes"
has been redrafted by Counsel to the Senate (Staff Working Draft, Apr. 16, 1999), and awaits introduction
by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Tex.). See Tetley, The Proposed New United States Senate
COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law, 30 J. Mar. L. &
Com. 595 (1999).
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coordinate the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act with other legislation of the
United States. 190
As a prognosticator, the State Department failed totally. COGSA has
always provided full-time employment for maritime lawyers and the case
law now fills 330 pages of the U.S. Code Annotated.
The second effort prepared by the Department of State involved diplo-
matic correspondence in an official note to the Italian Ambassador which
said:
The ratification of the Convention by the United States with its accompanying
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is an important step towards international
uniformity, with reference to the carriage of goods by sea. It is believed that
neither the understandings to which that ratification was made subject nor the
provision of either the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act or the Pomerene Bills of
Lading Act are out of harmony with the provisions of the Convention. 191
VI
INTERPRETATIONS OF COGSA BY THE SUPREME COURT
Given the continuous economic warfare 92 between the ship owning
interests 93 and the cargo owning interests 194 that has produced and
continues to produce a great volume of litigation, it is surprising that so few
cases have actually been decided by the Supreme Court, despite the efforts
of the bar to seek a writ of certiorari 95 whenever courts of appeal diverge
on the interpretation of COGSA.
The enactment of COGSA in 1936 did not clean the slate of Supreme
Court cases decided under the general maritime law 196 or the 1893 Harter
Act. 197 The pre-Harter Act cases would take on the luster of "public policy,"
190 See Knauth, supra note 66, at 84-85.
'
9
'id. at 88.
'
9 2This may be too strong an expression to describe litigation, congressional skirmishes, and
diplomatic arguments, but as an observer and commentator on the scene for 40 years, the author feels it
fairly describes his observations.19 3The shipowner, the time charterer(s), the voyage charterer(s), and the P & I club.
194The shipper, the consignee, the cargo insurer, and sometimes the charterer.
195Sturley, Observations on the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction in Intercircuit Conflict Cases,
67 Tex. L. Rev. 1251 (1989). See generally Sturley, Filing and Responding to a Petition of Certiorari, 24
J. Mar. L. & Com. 595 (1993) [hereinafter cited as Petition].
196New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchant's Bank of Boston (The Lexington), 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344
(1848); Clark v. Barnwell, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 272 (1851); Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.)
7 (1858); Bulkley v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 386 (1860); The Alabama, 92 U.S.
(2 Otto) 695 (1875); The Atlas, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 302 (1876); Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v.
Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
197See generally Birthday, supra note 73. Supreme Court cases interpreting the Harter Act from
1893-1934 are discussed id. at 14-25.
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while the Harter Act cases retained their vitality even after the passage of
COGSA. Not only did COGSA specifically preserve the Harter Act,' 98 but
the interpretation of the Harter Act as a remedial statute' 99 has been
extended to COGSA. 200 Thus, Harter Act cases continue to be cited in
COGSA disputes for the interpretive technique therein.20'
The small number of Supreme Court cases directly interpreting COGSA
does not make the task of the investigator easy; there are just too many
unanswered questions. Nevertheless, trends in Supreme Court interpretation
of other statutes (especially among justices with perceived agendas) may be
helpful in framing arguments in future disputed interpretations. 202
The three cases in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning
of COGSA involve exculpatory clauses, that is, bill of lading practices of the
shipping industry that brought about the need for government intervention in
Supreme Court cases interpreting the Harter Act after the enactment of COGSA are: Great Lakes
Transit Corp. v. Interstate S.S. Co., 301 U.S. 646, 1937 AMC 697 (1937) (insured bill of lading results
in waiver of Harter Act benefits by shipowner); Smith v. The Femcliff, 306 U.S. 444, 1939 AMC 403
(1939) (upholding the validity of a clause that adjusted damages on the basis of the value declared by the
shipper or net invoice cost plus disbursements, whichever was less); Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New
York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 1941 AMC 1697 (1941) (essentially dealing with limitation of
liability where a barge sank after its tanks were overfilled); Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River
Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411, 1959 AMC 1631 (1959) (a case dealing with tugboat liability and
exculpation in tariffs filed with the Federal Maritime Commission).
'9846 U.S.C. app. § 1311 provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as superseding any part of §§ 190-196 of this title, or
of any other law which would be applicable in the absence of this chapter, insofar as they relate to
the duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of the ship or carrier prior to the time when the goods are
loaded on or after the time they are discharged from the ship.
Likewise, the fourth sentence of 46 U.S.C. app. § 1312 states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be held to apply to contracts for carriage of goods by sea between any
port of the United States or its possessions, and any other port of the United States or its
possessions: Provided, however, That any bill of lading or similar document of title which is
evidence of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea between such ports, containing an express
statement that it shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter, shall be subjected hereto as fully
as if subject hereto by the express provisions of this chapter....
199 See supra notes 76-78.2
°°See United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. (The Esso Belgium), 343 U.S. 236, 1952 AMC 659
(1952).
2°1See, e.g., The Bill, 47 F. Supp. 969, 1942 AMC 1607 (D. Md. 1942), affd, 145 F.2d 470, 1944
AMC 883 (4th Cir. 1944), and Wirth Ltd. v. S/S Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1976 AMC 2178 (5th
Cir. 1976).202Controversial reinterpretations of traditional and consistent case law analyzing federal legislation
can be seen in such cases as: Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 1985 AMC 1700 (1985); Welch
v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 1987 AMC 2113 (1987); Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19,1991 AMC 1 (1990); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 1991
AMC 1697 (1991); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512
U.S. 267, 1994 AMC 2855 (1994); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 1995 AMC 1167 (1995); Metropolitan Stevedore Co.
v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 1995 AMC 1872 (1995); Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548,
1997 AMC 1817 (1997).
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the first place in 1893: adhesion "agreements" or printed exculpatory clauses
that cannot be bargained away by the shipper.20 3 It was the both to blame
clause in 1952, the Himalaya clause in 1959, and the foreign arbitration
clause in 1995. The proper question in all three cases is whether the
unbargained clause relieves carrier liability from the effect of negligence or
lessens carrier liability under COGSA, actions condemned by Congress in
1893 and 1936.
A. United States v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. (The Esso Belgium)2 0 4
In this case the Supreme Court held that the both to blame collision clause,
found in all bills of lading in North Atlantic trades, could not be enforced
against shippers by carriers.20 5 While the shippers might have argued that the
invalid clause lessened carrier liability, the Supreme Court's opinion did not
discuss the consequences of invalidity in COGSA terminology, but rather
was based on public policy against the clause 20 6 commencing in pre-Harter
act cases.
The problem in the Esso Belgium case can be traced to 1875, when the
Supreme Court applied the common law rule of joint and several liability of
tortfeasors to both to blame collisions so that the non-carrying colliding
vessel was liable to the cargo on the carrier vessel for 100% of its loss. 20 7
Carriers later argued that joint and several liability in collision had been
abrogated by the Harter Act, but the Supreme Court rejected this argument
203For prominent recognition of the differences between bargained contracts and adhesion agree-
ments, see Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L.
Rev. 629 (1943). The Supreme Court treated pre-printed exculpatory clauses as a special type of contract
and disapproved the same in New York Central R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873)
(railroad bill of lading), and Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397
(1889) (ocean bill of lading).
204343 U.S. 236, 1952 AMC 659 (1952).
201d. at 242.
2061d.
The language about relieving and lessening carrier liability originated in the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C.
app. §§ 190 and 191, concerning the carrier's liability for "negligence, fault or failure" and the carrier's
obligation to use due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.
The prominent position of the phrase in the Harter Act is somewhat obscured in COGSA, having been
placed at the end of the lengthy § 1303 on shipowner duties to cargo, but the positioning of the words
does not in itself indicate inferior status. Thus, this central provision of the Hague Rules, unaltered in
COGSA, states:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from
liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or
failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability otherwise
than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void and of no effect. ...
Hague Rules, art. 3(8); 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8).207The Alabama, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 695 (1875), and The Atlas, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 302 (1876). Only the
latter case is cited by the majority in The Esso Belgium.
Vol. 30, No. 4
October 1999 Prism 575
in The Chattahoochee,2 8 and American law continues to adhere to joint and
several liability of colliding vessels to innocent cargo in both to blame
situations. This rule was changed for signatory parties to the Brussels
Collisions Convention of 19 10,209 which provides for the several liability of
the carrier and non-carrier vessel in collisions involving property damage, as
opposed to personal injuries, so that the cargo owner can recover from these
vessels only the percentage of fault determined in the collision action, with
the further exculpation of the carrier vessel to her own cargo.
United States delegations opposed several liability to cargo during the
CMI discussions and at the diplomatic conference, but without success.2 10
Accordingly, the convention's rule would be bitterly opposed by American
shippers and cargo insurers. In 1936-37 there was hope in ship owning
circles that with the advent of COGSA, on which there was substantial
agreement within the entire shipping industry, a new attempt would be made
to resurrect the 1910 Collisions Convention.21' This effort eventually failed
208173 U.S. 540 (1899). See also Aktieselskabet Cuzco v. The Sucarseco, 294 U.S. 394, 1935 AMC
412 (1935).2
°9See supra note 81, at art. 4. The French original reads as follows:
Les dommages caus6s soit aux navires, soit A leurs cargaisons, soit aux effets ou autre biens des
equipages, des passagers ou d' autres personnes se trouvant h bord sont support6s par les navires
en faute, dans ladite proportion, sans solidarit6 i I' dgard des tiers.
The U.K. Maritime Conventions Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 57, § ](1), which ratified the 1910
convention, states:
Where, by the fault of two or more vessels, damage or loss is caused to one or more of those
vessels, to their cargoes or freight, or to any property on board, the liability to make good the
damage or loss shall be in proportion to the degree in which each vessel was in fault.
210Sweeney, Proportional Fault in Both to Blame Collisions, [1964] 11 Diritto Marittimo 549, 569-71
(Sp. Ed., Studi in Onore di Giorgio Berlingieri) [hereinafter cited as Proportional Fault].
21The Brussels Diplomatic Conference of 1910 prepared two conventions: Collisions and Salvage.
See supra note 81. In 1912, President William Howard Taft submitted only the Salvage Convention to
the Senate for advice and consent and subsequently proclaimed its ratification. See 37 Stat. 1658; T.S.
No. 576.
The Collisions Convention was not submitted to the Senate for advice and consent until April 1937,
at which time President Roosevelt forwarded it during the Senate's reconsideration of the Hague Rules
(see supra notes 180-82); hearings, however, were not held until June 1939 (see 1939 AMC 1051-69).
The treaty was favorably reported by the Foreign Relations Committee because the rule of indirect
liability of a carrier to its own cargo (The Chattahoochee, supra note 208) had been apparently repudiated
by COGSA's reaffirming of the defenses of negligent navigation and management in the Harter Act; for
reasons of international uniformity and equity, the Committee recommended advice and consent.
Nevertheless, the treaty received "contested treaty" calendar treatment (undoubtedly because of the
activity of cargo interests that demanded domestic legislation by both houses); as a result, the Senate
never gave advice and consent. See Exec. K, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted at 6 Benedict on Admiralty
4 (6th ed. 1940). See also MLA Doc. No. 161 at 1714-43. See generally Comment, The Difficult Quest
for a Uniform Maritime Law: Failure of the Brussels Conventions to Achieve International Agreement
on Collision Liability, Liens, and Mortgages, 64 Yale L.J. 878 (1955). President Harry S. Truman
withdrew the Collisions Convention from the Senate in 1947 as "obsolete." See 16 State Dep't Bull. 726
(1947).
Thereafter, the MLA recommended approval in 1961 as part of a package with the 1957 Limitation
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because of shipper opposition to the abolition of joint and several liability;
therefore the North Atlantic Freight Conference adopted the both to blame
clause in 1937 in an attempt to eliminate the carrier's indirect liability to its
own cargo because of joint and several liability. 2t 2
An unusual circumstance in The Esso Belgium case was the unexpected
advocacy in favor of the clause by the United States government; cargo
insurers opposed the clause as a violation of public policy. Another unusual
circumstance was the fact that the colliding shipowners had agreed on a
proportional division of the damages: 213 two-thirds fault to the Esso
Belgium, one-third fault to the Nathaniel Bacon, despite the extant rule of
The Schooner Catherine2t 4 calling for equal division of damages in both to
blame collisions.
The United States government owned the Nathaniel Bacon and appeared
as bailee of the cargo thereon. The Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company was
subrogated to the same cargo claims and intervened in the collision action
between the Esso Belgium and Nathaniel Bacon. By operation of joint and
several liability, Nathaniel Bacon cargo would have collected 100% of its
damages from the Esso Belgium, whose claim for collision damage would
include both the physical damage to the Esso Belgium and payments made
to third parties. Thus, Esso Belgium would collect one-third of its collision
damage claim (instead of one-half), because of the stipulation).
At this point the United States government attempted to enforce the clause
against its own cargo, claiming two-thirds of the amount paid to Nathaniel
Bacon cargo by the Esso Belgium.215 In the district court, Judge Medina
enforced the clause on behalf of the United States.216 The Second Circuit,
however, reversed in an opinion by Judge Clark, and the United States
sought further review. 21 7 The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit
of Shipowners' Liability Convention. See MLA Doc. No. 450 at 4742-62. This was an unfortunate
linkage because the personal injury bar was violently opposed to limitation of liability. Legislation was
introduced in 1961 (see S. 2313, S. 2314, H.R. 7911, and H.R. 7912, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.), but no action
was taken thereon.
212343 U.S. at 241. Recall the efforts of cargo insurers to outlaw the both to blame clause as part of
COGSA, supra notes 173-74 and 176-78 and accompanying text.
213343 U.S. at 237.
21458 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).
215343 U.S. at 239.
21690 F. Supp. 836, 1950 AMC 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
217191 F.2d 370, 1951 AMC 1435 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 913 (1952).
The Second Circuit wrote:
The shipowners stress the consensual nature of the clause, arguing that a bill of lading is but a
contract. But that is so at most in name only; the clause, as we are told, is now in practically all
bills of lading issued by steamship companies doing business to and from the United States.
Obviously the individual shipper has no opportunity to repudiate the document agreed upon by the
trade, even if he has actually examined it and all of its twenty-eight lengthy paragraphs, of which
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7-2 in a loosely reasoned opinion by Justice Black. 2 18 Justices Frankfurter
and Burton dissented.
The question framed by the majority was whether the Harter Act defense
of negligent navigation for carriers, reenacted in COGSA, carved out a
special statutory exception to the public policy against stipulations immu-
nizing carriers from their own or their agents' negligence. 2 19 Although the
cited cases traced the history of exculpatory clauses, the Court sought
support for its negative conclusion in The Kensington,220 a passenger
luggage case, used because the Court had found language that Congress had
not changed the general rule of non-immunity for negligence, and thus by
clear implication had approved it.221 Justice Black also noted that the public
policy of non-immunity had acquired the force and precision of legislation
because it had been a continuous guide for more than a century. 222 Argument
that the both to blame clause bore the same relation to the Harter Act and
COGSA as the approved general average Jason clause bore to The
Irrawaddy was held to be irrelevant because the Jason clause represented a
this clause is No. 9. This lack of equality in bargaining power has long been recognized in our law;
and stipulations for unreasonable exemption of the carrier have not been allowed to stand.
191 F.2d at 374 (emphasis added).2 1SHugo L. Black (1886-1971), from rural Alabama, studied law at the University of Alabama, where
he received his LL.B. in 1906, and practiced in Birmingham from 1907-27, during which time he joined
the Ku Klux Klan, the Knights of Pythias, the Odd Fellows, and the Masons. He entered politics as part
of his law practice, becoming Police Court Judge in 1911, County Solicitor in 1914, and, after outpolling
four other candidates in an open primary, U.S. Senator in 1927. After ten years, he was part of the
Democratic leadership of the Senate. He strongly supported FDR's New Deal, major portions of which
were held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935-36, leading to FDR's plan to "pack" the Court
with additional appointees for every justice over the age of 70 (see supra note 141). During the political
fight on the plan, the Court upheld a state minimum wage law and Justice Van Devanter announced his
retirement. The beneficiary of these changes was Senator Black; he was confirmed by a vote of 63-16
(the opposition was made up of 10 Republicans and six Democrats). Then, revelation of his KKK
membership resulted in a demand for his impeachment before he could take his seat. His nationwide radio
confession and apologia saved him.
Justice Black became one of the most controversial members of the Court; his violent disagreements
with Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson resembled ancient blood feuds and his opinions still
produce academic controversies.
The loose reasoning of Esso Belgium may be compared to his dissent in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947), on the incorporation of the Bill of Rights (specifically the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
on self-incrimination) against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment; Justice Black's dissent
found a total incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment despite contra-indications
in the historical record. See further G. Dunne, Hugo Black and the Judicial Revolution (1977), and J.
Frank, Mr. Justice Black: The Man and His Opinions (1948).
219343 U.S. at 239-40.
220183 U.S. 263 (1902). The Harter Act was indirectly incorporated into the subject ticket by
reference to the terms of the shipowner's bill of lading. The Court found the arbitrary limit of recovery
of 250 francs (about $50), without an accompanying right to increase the liability amount by an adequate
and reasonable proportional payment, to be void as against public policy.
1211d. at 268-69.
222343 U.S. at 239.
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sharing in same ship general average, although the Harter Act would have
prevented it, while the both to blame clause relieved the carrier of liability
to the other ship in circumstances where the carrier was not relieved from
responsibility. 223
Justice Frankfurter's dissent began with his objection to the Court
interfering in private business agreements and quickly passed to the nature
of the judicial process224-that judges are thrown upon their own resources
in ascertaining public policy where there has been no legislative guidance,
but when the legislature has formulated public policy they must carry it
out-applying declared defined policy, judges must disregard their personal
views of the public good.22 5
Justice Frankfurter's view of the 1893 Harter Act compromise and its
reenactment in COGSA was that carriers had been relieved of liability as
insurers for faulty navigation, in exchange for which they were required to
forego certain exculpatory clauses.22 6 He viewed the Harter Act as a
rejection of a public policy against exculpating carriers from their own
negligence because of the statutory defenses of negligent navigation and
2131d. at 241.
2241d. at 244-45.
Felix Frankfurter (1882-1965) was born in Vienna, Austria, emigrated to New York City at the age
of 12, and later graduated from the City College of New York (A.B. 1902) and Harvard University (LL.B.
1906). He was an assistant U.S. Attorney (to Henry L. Stimson) and served with Stimson in politics,
practice, and the Southern District of New York before being appointed to the faculty of Harvard Law
School in 1913. He remained at Harvard for 26 years until, in 1939, he was selected to succeed Justice
Benjamin N. Cardozo on the U.S. Supreme Court.
As an academic, he had advised President Wilson on labor law (1916-18) and President Roosevelt
(before and after his appointment to the Court) on regulatory aspects of the New Deal and positions for
his former students. His own mentors on the Court were undoubtedly Justices Holmes and Brandeis,
whose liberal goals he tempered with judicial restraint, balancing of interests, and deference to the
legislative will. After 13 years on the Court, Justice Frankfurter could no longer be called a radical or
even a liberal, and his dissent in Esso Belgium is consistent with the developments in his thinking about
the deference owed to private agreements and the will of the 1893 Congress. See generally L. Baker,
Brandeis and Frankfurter: A Dual Biography (1984); B. Murphy, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection
(1982); Felix Frankfurter Reminisces (H. Phillips ed. 1960).
In crafting his Esso Belgium dissent, it is possible that Justice Frankfurter was relying on the thoughts
of Justice Cardozo as set forth in The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), which were drawn from the
latter's Storrs Lectures at Yale University. This provocative book introduced elements of sociological
analysis into a basically positivist approach to legal sources, thereby stressing the purposes and functions
of the law rather than its abstract formal character.
Justice Cardozo's death at the age of 68 cut short his six year service on the U.S. Supreme Court,
which came after 18 years on the New York State Court of Appeals, six of which were spent as Chief
Judge. Justice Cardozo wrote the majority opinion in May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt A.G.
(The Isis), 290 U.S. 333, 1933 AMC 1565 (1933), expounding, in dictum, the doctrine of non-causal
unseaworthiness under the Harter Act.
225343 U.S. at 245.
22 6Id.
management. Thus, the Court could not revive a public policy discarded by
Congress.
227
Justice Frankfurter's reading of The Chattahoochee22 8 was that the Harter
Act itself did not eliminate the consequences of joint and several liability in
collisions, but that the parties might choose to do so by contract, 229 citing
The Jason.230 His reasoning would find an echo in Justice Whittaker's
dictum about the Himalaya clause in Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill
Machinery Corp.2 3' Because of The Jason, contracting for immunity from
an indirect liability closely resembled contracting for participation in general
average.232
Justice Frankfurter's dissent properly takes the majority to task for its use
of The Kensington as an authoritative expression of public policy because
the Harter Act, by its terms, applied only to vessels carrying cargo and
Congress had not provided that passengers' luggage should be treated the
same as cargo.233 To summarize the dissent, the Harter Act defense of
negligent navigation established congressional public policy that did not
condemn the both to blame clause. 234
Justice Frankfurter's view of the defense of negligent navigation as public
policy replacing the traditional opposition to exculpatory clauses does seem
misplaced in view of the drafting history of the Harter Act,235 where the
negligent navigation defense emerged only as a quid pro quo for further
American opposition to British exculpatory clauses. Furthermore, The
Chattahoochee appears to be correct in law and policy, especially in view of
continued United States opposition to several liability as against acceptance
thereof by the CMI. 236
Justice Frankfurter's well-reasoned dissent would have lost its force if
Justice Black had confined himself to The Chattahoochee and suppressed
2271Id.
2 2 8See supra note 208.
229343 U.S. at 246.
230225 U.S. 32 (1912).
2 31See infra notes 238-61.
2 32The Jason Clause tracks the language of § 3 of the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 192, for the purpose
of the liability of shippers to make contribution in general average.
233183 U.S. at 268.
234343 U.S. at 249 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("I would recognize that the Congressional
pronouncement of public policy-when it exempted carriers from liability for faulty navigation-
precludes our striking down the clause here in issue.").
235 See Birthday, supra note 73, at 8-14.
236 The CMI's adoption of several liability was based on The Milan, 167 Eng. Rep. 167 (Adm. 1861).
This theoretical proportionality would greatly influence the 1910 Diplomatic Conference despite the
notional innocence of cargo in the shipowners' faults. The MLA was not organized until 1899, thus
6inited States views were not considered at important CMI meetings on collision damages in 1897 and
1898. See Proportional Fault, supra note 210, at 568-71.
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reliance on The Kensington. However, the majority's policy choice accom-
modated economic reality: the United States was no longer a great ship
owning nation. Thousands of its ships were tied up in moth ball fleets, never
to sail again except to be scrapped. Yet the United States continued to be the
most important trading nation in the world. 237 If the United States chose to
penalize its cargo owning interests for the benefit of foreign carriers and
their insurers, that choice had to be made by Congress and not by the
carriers' unbargained adhesion clauses.
Nowhere in the majority opinion, nor in the dissent, is the treaty origin of
COGSA mentioned. The decision is entirely a question of statutory
interpretation.
B. Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp.2 38
In this case a 19-ton industrial press was being loaded by an independent
contractor, a stevedore, into the S.S. Castillo Ampudia at Baltimore for
carriage to Valencia, Spain. The seller had sent the press, along with 61 other
packages, on a railroad flatcar from Detroit to a Baltimore terminal
alongside which the ship was tied up. The carrier's bill of lading had been
given to the shipper's agent by the carrier's agent on the carrier's form. The
stevedore's crew negligently dropped the press into Baltimore harbor,
thereby causing substantial damage to its parts. 239 The shipper sued the
stevedore in tort, who answered by denying negligence and pleading
limitation of liability to $500 per package because of COGSA or alterna-
tively a bill of lading clause. 240
The trial court held the stevedore liable to the shipper for the full damages,
$47,992.04, rather than the $500 package limit. 24' The Fourth Circuit
affirmed unanimously. 242 Because of conflict with a Fifth Circuit decision,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 243 The Fifth Circuit's protection of
stevedores without even a bill of lading clause in their favor would be
decisively rejected by the Supreme Court.
Justice Whittaker, speaking for a unanimous Court, affirmed. 2 4 In the
237Mangone, supra note 114.
238359 U.S. 297, 1958 AMC 879 (1957).
2391d. at 298.
24°Id. at 298-99.
241155 F. Supp. 296, 1957 AMC 2188 (D. Md. 1957).
242256 F.2d 946, 1958 AMC 1265 (4th Cir. 1958).
243358 U.S. 812 (1958). See also Petition, supra note 195, at 664-66 (hypothetical pool memorandum
authored by Professor Sturley), and Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The
Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 Va. J. Int'l L. 729, 749-51 (1987)
[hereinafter cited as Influence].
244359 U.S. at 301. Justice Whittaker referred to the origins of COGSA as follows:
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Supreme Court the stevedore argued for limitation of liability to $500 per
package based on COGSA and the bill of lading. Respecting direct
applicability of COGSA defenses to stevedores, the stevedore argued that
stevedores must necessarily have been included in the Hague Rules and
COGSA because they are necessarily included in the carriage of goods.
Alternatively, the stevedore argued that stevedores act as agents of the
carrier. Both assertions were rejected. Neither the Hague Rules nor COGSA
make any reference to stevedores. 245 Furthermore, the press was dropped
into the water before loading into the ship had begun; thus, by its terms,
COGSA would not apply, because COGSA applies from loading on to the
vessel and limits its protection to the ship or the carrier-either the owner
or charterer.
246
Respecting the Fifth Circuit case that extended carrier protections to
stevedores as agents, A.M. Collins & Co. v. Panama R.R. Co.,247 the Court
expressly disapproved its immunization of agents for their own negligence
in derogation of the common law, looking back to the 1824 authority of
Osborn v. Bank of the United States,24 8 but also citing Boston Metals Co. v.
The legislative history of the Act shows that it was lifted almost bodily from the Hague Rules of
1921, as amended by the Brussels Convention of 1924, 51 Stat. 233. The effort of those Rules was
to establish uniform ocean bills of lading to govem the rights and liabilities of carriers and shippers
inter se in international trade. Ibid. Those Rules do not advert to stevedores or agents of a carrier.
The debates and Committee Reports in the Senate and the House upon the bill that became the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act likewise do not mention stevedores or agents.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Charles E. Whittaker (1901-73) came from a Kansas farm. He entered the law school at the
University of Kansas City directly from high school (a common practice at the time), and was admitted
to the Kansas bar in 1923. Thereafter, he practiced law in Kansas City until 1954, when he was appointed
to the U.S. District Court; after two years, he was elevated to the Eighth Circuit; after little more than
seven months, he was nominated to replace Justice Reed at the U.S. Supreme Court. He retired in 1962,
after just five years on the Court.
245359 U.S. at 301 ("'We can only conclude that if Congress had intended to make such an inroad on
the rights of claimants (against negligent agents) it would have said so in unambiguous terms' and 'in the
absence of a clear Congressional policy to that end, we cannot go so far.'').
Stevedores are "independent contractors" in most instances, although they may be agents or
employees of the principal in accordance with the factual relationship. While "employee" means the same
thing in all languages and legal systems, the same cannot be said of "agent" or "independent contractor."
Id. at 299 and 301.
24646 U.S.C. app. § 1301(a). There is, however, authority to apply COGSA during the "process of
loading" in cases dealing with damage to cargo in lighters alongside the ocean-going vessel. See Hoegh
Lines v. Green Truck Sales, Inc., 298 F.2d 240, 1962 AMC 431 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 817
(1962).
Knauth's approach to the period of carrier responsibility was a factual determination whether the
goods on the tackle or in the pipeline had crossed the vessel's sides as extended vertically. See Knauth,
supra note 66, at 144.24 7197 F.2d 893, 1952 AMC 2054 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952).
2482 2 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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The Winding Guf, 2 49 one of a series of three 1955 cases250 dealing with
public policy in the tug and tow industry.
Respecting the bill of lading, it must be noted that this is not a Himalaya
clause case; that clause was missing in the bill of lading and the stevedore
was forced to argue that stevedores were "necessarily" included in the bill of
lading exculpatory clauses, either as agents of the carrier or as third-party
beneficiaries of the contract of carriage, because of the language of a general
clause limiting liability to $500 per package, "unless the nature of such
goods and a value higher than $500 per package.., shall have been declared
in writing" and "unless payment of the extra freight charge incident thereto
shall have been made or promised . ,,251 The stevedore argued that its
interpretation was supported by the House of Lords, 252 but the Supreme
Court found that English case not to have decided the point.253 Two
Australian cases2 54 were also cited by the stevedore, but they had been later
expressly disapproved by the higher court. 255 Thus, there was no authority to
apply this clause to stevedores unless there was an express exoneration by
statute or contract (which did not exist here).
While this case rejected the extension of carrier defenses to stevedores by
interpretation of COGSA, it would become the foundation of the extension
of these same carrier defenses to stevedores through bill of lading clauses
known as Himalaya clauses. 256 (The carrier defenses usually sought by
stevedores are the one year time bar and the $500 per package limitation of
liability.2 57) There was no specific approval of bill of lading clauses in
dictum. However, there was also no suggestion of a condemnation of such
clauses on public policy grounds. Justice Whittaker's careful language left
249349 U.S. 122, 1955 AMC 927 (1955).
25 0The others being Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 1955 AMC 899 (1955), and
United States v. Nielson, 349 U.S. 129, 1955 AMC 935 (1955).
251359 U.S. at 299.
252Elder Dempster & Co. v. Paterson, Zochonis & Co., [19241 A.C. 522 (H.L.).
253359 U.S. at 307. See also T. Scrutton, Charter Parties and Bills of Lading 286-87 (W. McNair &
A. Mocatta eds., 16th ed. 1955).
254Gilbert, Stokes & Kerr Pty. Ltd. v. Dalgety & Co., (1948) 81 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 337 (N.S.W.
Sup. Ct.), and Waters Trading Co. v. Dalgety & Co., [1951] 2 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 385 (N.S.W. Sup. Ct.).
25 5Wilson v. Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co., [1956] 1 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 346 (Austl.
High Ct.).
25 61n Adler v. Dickinson, [1954] 2 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 267 (C.A.), a passenger on the ship Himalaya
successfully sued the master and bosun in tort for personal injuries, rather than suing the contractual
carrier whose passage ticket contained an exculpatory clause. Because the court failed to extend
exculpatory provisions of the passage contract to the carrier's servants or agents. exculpatory clauses,
known as Himalaya clauses, came to be added to contracts such as ocean bills of lading. Himalaya clause
exculpations were recognized under an agency theory in Midland Silicones, Ltd. v. Scruttons, Ltd.,
[1962] A.C. 446 (H.L.).
25746 U.S.C. app. § 1303(6), fourth paragraph (one year time bar), and 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5) ($500
per package unit limitation of liability).
open for future decision the application of COGSA defenses to stevedores
by bill of lading clauses in derogation of state common law and the strict
liability of bailees. Justice Whittaker wrote:
There is, thus, nothing in those provisions to indicate that the contracting
parties intended to limit the liability of stevedores or other agents of the carrier
for damages caused by their negligence. If such had been a purpose of the
contracting parties it must be presumed that they would in some way have
expressed it in the contract. Since they did not do so, it follows that the
provisions of the bill of lading did 'not cut off (respondent's) remedy against
the agent that did the wrongful act.' 258
In the context of COGSA itself, a Himalaya clause extending carrier
protections to stevedores could not violate § 1303(8) because the clause does
not lessen carrier liability under COGSA.
Since 1959, courts of appeal have had a variety of responses to the
Himalaya clause. Initially, the clauses were given a very strict scrutiny that
required very specific language extending the carrier defenses to a very
clearly defined class of beneficiaries. 259 Later, the essential element would
be the bargaining by which the shipper surrendered its claim against the
stevedore in order to benefit from lower rates to load and unload the vessel;
the economic effect being a saving to consumers by elimination of dual or
triple insurance on the same goods.260 Now the Himalaya clause has
258359 U.S. at 302.
259See, e.g., Cabot Corp. v. S.S. Mormacscan, 441 F.2d 476, 1971 AMC 1130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 855 (1971); Rupp v. International Terminal Operating Co., 479 F.2d 674, 1973 AMC 1093 (2d
Cir. 1973); De Laval Turbine, Inc. v. West India Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 259, 1974 AMC 1156 (3d Cir.
1974); Toyomenka, Inc. v. S.S. Tosaharu Maru, 523 F.2d 518, 1975 AMC 1820 (2d Cir. 1975); La Salle
Mach. Tool, Inc. v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 611 F.2d 56, 1980 AMC 1187 (4th Cir. 1979); Mikinberg v.
Baltic S.S. Co., 988 F.2d 327, 1993 AMC 1661 (2d Cir. 1993), on remand, 1995 AMC 779 (E.D.N.Y.
1994), aff d mem., 60 F.3d 811, 1995 AMC 2408 (2d Cir. 1995). See generally Hooper, Legal
Relationships: Terminal Owners, Operators, and Users, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 595 (1989); Palmer & DeGiulio,
Terminal Operations and Multimodal Carriage: History and Prognosis, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 281 (1989);
Zawitoski, Federal, State, and International Regulation of Marine Terminal Operators in the United
States, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 439 (1989). See also Zawitoski, Limitation of Liability for Stevedores and
Terminal Operators Under the Carrier's Bill of Lading and COGSA, 16 J. Mar. L. & Com. 337 (1985),
and Note, Carriage of Goods by Sea: Application of the Himalaya Clause to Subdelegees of the Carrier,
2 Mar. Law. 91 (Oct. 1977).
26°See, e.g., Secrest Mach. Corp. v. S.S. Tiber, 450 F.2d 285, 1972 AMC 815 (5th Cir. 1971); Bernard
Screen Printing Corp. v. Meyer Line, 464 F.2d 934, 1972 AMC 1919 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 910 (1973); Brown & Root v. MIV Peisander, 648 F.2d 415, 1982 AMC 929 (5th Cir. 1981); Certain
Underwriters at Lloyds' v. Barber Blue Sea Line, 675 F.2d 266, 1982 AMC 2638 (1I1th Cir. 1982); B.
Elliot (Canada) Ltd. v. John T. Clark & Son of Maryland, Inc., 704 F.2d 1305, 1983 AMC 1742 (4th Cir.
1983); Koppers Co. v. S/S Defiance, 704 F.2d 1309, 1983 AMC 1748 (4th Cir. 1983); Seguros Illimani
S.A. v. MIV Popi P, 929 F.2d 89, 1991 AMC 1529 (2d Cir. 1991); Taisho Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v.
Maersk Line, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 336, 1993 AMC 705 (N.D. Il. 1992), affd mem., 7 F.3d 238, 1994 AMC
608 (7th Cir. 1993).
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achieved such general acceptance that broad exculpations of stevedores and
others will be approved without reference to bargaining. Furthermore, the
present favorable attitude of the United States Department of Transportation
to such clauses should be noted: benefits available to carriers should also be
available to stevedores and terminal operators. 26'
The opinion mentioned the treaty origins of COGSA, but drew the same
conclusion from the treaty that was drawn from the statute.
C. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer 26 2
In this case the Supreme Court ruled that a clause calling for foreign
arbitration of a cargo damage dispute in a bill of lading does not lessen the
carrier's liability under COGSA. 263 The decision had been anticipated
because of the Court's 1991 holding in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute,264 and because of its trend towards "overzealous formalism," in the
words of the lone dissenter, Justice Stevens.265
The Supreme Court's statement of the facts tracks the version presented
by the Court of Appeals in most respects. Unfortunately, the facts from the
district court266 are more complicated and alternative forms of strategy and
tactics might have put a different result to this dispute.
In the Supreme Court's version of the facts, Bacchus Associates of New
York, a wholesale fruit distributor in New England, was the shipper and
consignee of a shipload of oranges and lemons shipped from Agadir,
Morocco to New Bedford, Massachusetts. Bacchus had purchased the fruits
from Galaxi Negoce S.A. of Morocco. The cargo was carried onboard the
Panamanian flag vessel Sky Reefer. Thousands of boxes of oranges shifted
during the voyage, crushing and spoiling the fruit and causing a loss of $1
million to Bacchus. 267
When Bacchus negotiated for the carriage of the fruit it needed a
refrigerated vessel, and the Sky Reefer was available; she was owned by
M.H. Maritima, S.A. of Panama but had been time chartered to Honma
Sempaku Co., Ltd. of Japan, who in turn time-chartered the vessel to Nichiro
Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. of Japan. Bacchus then chartered her from Nichiro.
26 1See Larsen, Sweeney, Falvey & Zawitoski, The Treaty on Terminal Operator Liability in
International Trade, 25 J. Mar. L. & Com. 339 (1994).
262515 U.S. 528, 1995 AMC 1817 (1995).
26 31d. at 541.
264499 U.S. 585, 1991 AMC 1697 (1991). The Court enforced a Florida choice of forum clause in the
passage contract of a Liberian flag vessel on residents of Washington state who were able to serve
defendants there. See 515 U.S. at 535-36.265 1d. at 556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/N Sky Reefer, 1993 WL 137483, *3 (D. Mass. 1993).
267515 U.S. at 531.
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The voyage charter party contained a clause calling for arbitration in
London. (The stated facts do not refer to possible arbitration clauses in the
Maritima-Honma time charter nor the Honma-Nichiro time charter.) Thus,
as between Bacchus and Nichiro, a cargo damage dispute ought to have been
arbitrated in London, subject to the law of the charter party, in which there
is no aspect of public policy against the arm's length bargaining between
shipowner and charterer. Furthermore, because the bill of lading issued by
Nichiro to Bacchus (calling for arbitration in Japan) had not yet been
negotiated to a third party, COGSA did not apply due to the charter party
exclusion in 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301(b) and 1305.268
Questions as to the cause of the $1 million damage to the fruit by
"crushing of boxes" during the voyage raise the issue of the responsibility of
the charterer for loading the cargo through the stevedore hired by it. At this
point, the further complication of payment and subrogation becomes
important, as well as the insurer's decision to pursue a judicial remedy in the
United States against the ship in rem and the shipowner in personam under
the theories of unseaworthiness and negligence. Neither defendant was a
party to the Nichiro-Bacchus voyage charter calling for London arbitra-
tion;269 thus, the subrogated plaintiff's decision must have combined
strategy and tactics: the certainty of the enforcement of a London
arbitration clause in the charter party against the uncertainty of a Tokyo
arbitration clause in the bill of lading. For the defendants, the non-
applicability under COGSA of that charter party bill of lading also presented
uncertainty: if COGSA does not apply, is it replaced by the Harter Act or
common law bailment for hire? The defendants' choice of battle over the
arbitration clause was absolutely the wisest choice for them. A further
uncertainty was Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, which was lurking in
the wings even though Sky Reefer involved an arbitration clause rather than
a choice of forum clause.
The plaintiff, a Spanish cargo insurer, paid the consignee $733,442.90 on
the loss and sued the vessel owner, Maritima, in personam, and the ship, in
rem, in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 270
Maritima defended on the basis of the time charter to Nichiro, whereby
Nichiro, as carrier, had issued the bill of lading covering the goods to the
shipper; the bill of lading had a choice of law clause selecting Japanese law
as the law of the contract 27' and a forum selection clause referring all
disputes to arbitration in Tokyo before the Tokyo Maritime Arbitration
2681Id.
2691d.
270See supra note 266.
27 1
"The contract evidenced by or contained in this Bill of Lading shall be governed by the Japanese
law." 515 U.S. at 531.
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Commission of the Japan Shipping Exchange. 272 The ship owning interests
moved to stay the action and compel arbitration in Tokyo under the bill of
lading and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 273 The plaintiffs opposed the
motion on the ground that the arbitration clause was unenforceable as a
contract of adhesion and under COGSA as a clause lessening the carrier's
liability. 274 The alleged issue was a perceived conflict between the FAA and
COGSA and the priority of the amended FAA over the unamended
COGSA.
2 7 5
The District Court rejected both of the plaintiffs' contentions, stayed the
actions, and compelled arbitration in Tokyo, but certified the question of the
invalidity of the arbitration clause under COGSA to the First Circuit as
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The District Court, however, retained
jurisdiction pending arbitration. 276
The First Circuit2 77 had doubts about the foreign arbitration clause, but
assumed its invalidity because it lessened the carrier's COGSA liability
under the Second Circuit's widely followed en banc opinion in Indussa
Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg,2 78 which overruled William H. Muller & Co. v.
Swedish American Line (The Oklahoma),279 an earlier decision reaching the
opposite conclusion.
Indussa contains the policy rationale against foreign forums and foreign
law because of the potential "immunization" of carriers from small claims
(clearly not the Sky Reefer case-$1 million in damages-but certainly
2721n full, the clause read as follows:
Any dispute arising from this Bill of Lading shall be referred to arbitration in Tokyo by the Tokyo
Maritime Arbitration Commission (TOMAC) of The Japanese Shipping Exchange, Inc., in
accordance with the rules of TOMAC and any amendment thereto, and the award given by the
arbitrators shall be final and binding on both parties.
Id. 273Specifically, they relied on 9 U.S.C. § 3, which provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such
suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable
to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
274515 U.S. at 532.
2751d. at 533.
2761d. at 532. The court's reasoning relied on Citrus Mktg. Bd. of Israel v. MN Ecuadorian Reefer,
754 F. Supp. 229, 1991 AMC 1042 (D. Mass. 1990).
27729 F.3d 727, 1994 AMC 2513 (lst Cir. 1994).
278377 F.2d 200, 1967 AMC 589 (2d Cir. 1967). The opinion is the en banc unanimous resolution of
the appeal. Seven of the eight judges agreed with Judge Henry J. Friendly that the choice of forum clause
violated § 1303(8). Judge Leonard P. Moore concurred in the result but held the Oklahoma, see infra note
279, distinguishable.
279224 F.2d 806, 1955 AMC 1687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
Vol. 30, No. 4
October 1999 Prism 587
Indussa-$2,600 in damages). 280 Despite the obvious nexus to the American
forum because of unloading here and the statutory language in § 1312
applying COGSA to imports and exports, Judge Friendly noted that
enforcing the foreign forum clause could require the American plaintiff to
move proofs and witnesses thousands of miles to an unfamiliar legal system
and an unfamiliar language. 28' (Indussa also had another interpretive
problem in that the forum could have been Norway, the owner's nation, or
Costa Rica, the charterer's nation.282) Furthermore, under the terms of the
Hague Rules, Belgian law could have been applied as the place where the
bill of lading was issued. Judge Friendly, however, concluded that the
plaintiff's choice of the American forum could not be ousted.283
With a few exceptions, Indussa had been followed in bill of lading cases
since 1967,284 and, until recently, neither choice of forum nor choice of law
clauses were common in bills of lading because of the American "Clause
Paramount. '2 85 The strength of the Indussa rationale continued to be
280377 F.2d at 201.
281Judge Friendly wrote:
We think that Congress meant to invalidate any contractual provision in a bill of lading for a
shipment to or from the United States that would prevent cargo able to obtain jurisdiction over a
carrier in an American court from having that court entertain the suit and apply the substantive rules
Congress had prescribed.
Id. at 203.
282The forum clause in Indussa provided, "Any dispute arising under this Bill of Lading shall be
decided in the country where the Carrier has his principal place of business .... Id. at 201. In accordance
with § 1301(a), the "carrier" included the owner (Norwegian) or the charterer (Costa Rican).283"[W]e think it preferable to relieve cargo asserting claims in this Circuit under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act and also our district judges from the burden of Muller, without further delay or
imposition upon a busy Supreme Court." 377 F.2d at 204.
284See, e.g., Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 1982 AMC 588 (4th Cir.
1981); Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1988 AMC 1495 (8th Cir. 1986);
Conklin & Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441, 1988 AMC 318 (5th Cir. 1987); State Estab.
for Agr. Product Trading v. MN Wesermunde, 838 F.2d 1576, 1988 AMC 2328 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 916 (1988); Hughes Drilling Fluids v. MV Luo Fu Shan, 852 F.2d 840, 1988 AMC 2848 (5th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989). See generally Nakazawa & Moghaddam, COGSA and
Choice of Law Clauses in Bills of Lading, 17 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1 (1992), and Comment, Forum Selection
in Maritime Bills of Lading Under COGSA, 12 Fordham Int'l L.J. 459 (1989).
285The typical Clause Paramount reads as follows:
This bill of lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
of the United States, approved April 16, 1936, which shall be deemed to be incorporated herein,
and nothing herein contained shall be deemed a surrender by the carrier of any of its rights or
immunities or an increase of any of its responsibilities or liabilities under said Act. If any term of
this bill of lading be repugnant to said Act to any extent, such term shall be void to that extent, but
no further.
See generally 46 U.S.C. app. § 1312. Another version of the Clause Paramount adds, "or to any law
similar to the 1924 Hague Rules or Hague-Visby Rules if such law is compulsorily applicable to this Bill
of Lading in the country where suit is brought .... COGSA, rather than the Hague-Visby Rules, was
applied in Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. M.V. Tourcoing, 167 F.3d 99, 1999 AMC 913 (2d Cir.
1999), a case in which the Clause Paramount referred to both instruments.
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asserted despite the Supreme Court's preference for a foreign forum in MIS
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,286 a towage contract where the London
forum clause was not pre-printed but negotiated. The Supreme Court had
also indicated its preference for arbitration in international commercial
transactions, demonstrated by the cases cited by Justice Kennedy in Sky
Reefer.287 Because of a conflict with the Eleventh Circuit,2 88 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Sky Reefer.289
The First Circuit had affirmed the trial court's compulsion of arbitration
in Tokyo, despite Indussa, because the FAA was assumed to be the later and
more specific expression of congressional intent and thereby entitled to
priority over COGSA. 290 While COGSA has never been amended since its
enactment in 1936, the FAA of 1925 had been amended in 1947 and 1970.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court did not go into the question of the priority
of enactment, although that issue was extensively argued by the parties.
Because of its dualistic reading of COGSA, the Supreme Court found no
conflict between the FAA and COGSA. Thus, the issue decided by the
286407 U.S. 1, 1972 AMC 1407 (1972).
28 7See 515 U.S. at 538 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985), and Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
288See State Estab. for Agr. Product Trading v. MV Wesermunde, 838 F.2d 1576, 1988 AMC 2328
(Ilth Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 916 (1988).
289513 U.S. 1013 (1994).
The Supreme Court almost reviewed the question of foreign forum selection clauses in Carbon Black
Export, Inc. v. SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 1958 AMC 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 809 (1958),
cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180, 1959 AMC 1327 (1959). In Carbon Black, the bill of lading clause
provided, "no legal proceeding may be brought against the Captain or ship owners or their agents in
respect to any loss of or damage to any goods ... except in Genoa." The cargo owner brought an action
in personam against the Italian shipowner and an action in rein against the carrying vessel. The District
Court dismissed based on The Oklahoma, see supra note 279. The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the
forum selection clause in the in rem proceeding as a violation of public policy. Certiorari was initially
granted, but in a 5-4 change of mind after oral argument, the petition was dismissed as improvidently
granted because the cargo damage action could still be maintained in rem, even though no longer
maintainable in personam, because the forum selection clause protected only the master, shipowner, and
agents and not the ship. Justices Frankfurter, Whittaker, Harlan, and Stewart dissented. See also
Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara Pusat v. MN Tel Aviv, 711 F.2d 1231, 1985 AMC 67 (5th Cir. 1983),
where the court held that an arrest in rein, by itself, did not tip the balancing test in favor of American
jurisdiction. Id. at 1238.
The context of Carbon Black was different from the compulsory arbitration of Sky Reefer, in that the
carrier interest sought to use the discretionary authority of the courts to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds, 22 years before the Supreme Court treated this defense in a systematic way in Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 1982 AMC 214 (1981). In 1959, the task for plaintiffs was to find factors of
legal, economic, and political significance to persuade an American court that foreign defendants truly
belonged before the court despite protestations of unfairness or even forum selection or law selection
clauses; the factor that proved effective in 1959 was arrest of the vessel in rein. See Annot., Effect of
American Citizenship or Residency of Libelant who has Alternate Forum Abroad on Applicability of
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Admiralty Action Brought in United States District Court, 70
A.L.R. Fed. 875 (1984).
29029 F.3d at 731-33.
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Supreme Court concerning COGSA had been of secondary concern to the
arbitration issue in the First Circuit.
The Supreme Court had to decide whether bill of lading clauses requiring
foreign arbitration under foreign law lessens the carrier's COGSA liability.
The Supreme Court, per Justice Kennedy,291 held that the carrier's COGSA
liability was not lessened by the presence of these clauses.292 Here the
Court's reliance on the 1924 treaty and foreign decisions was crucial. Five
justices agreed with Justice Kennedy's opinion; Justice O'Connor con-
curred; Justice Breyer did not participate; and Justice Stevens dissented.
Justice Kennedy examined Indussa and the line of cases following its
reasoning and rejected Indussa itself on the ground that the statutory
language ("lessen liability") of § 1303(8) refers to two issues: a substantive
guarantee that liability will not be lessened, 293 and the procedural issue for
enforcing the guarantee. 294 Respecting the latter, he found no statutory
language to prevent the parties from "agreeing to enforce these obligations
in a particular forum."2 95 The Court's principal authority was its 1991
decision in Shute,296 enforcing a Florida forum selection clause in a passage
contract against a personal injury plaintiff from Washington state. That case
found that the language of the forum clause did not "lessen, weaken, or
avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by court of competent jurisdiction
on the question of liability .... 297
The Sky Reefer Court said that "lessening such liability" excluded
increases in "transaction costs of litigation" 298 and referred to a 1927 English
decision, Maharani Woollen Mills Co. v. Anchor Line,299 decided before the
Hague Rules were in force as a treaty, and also referred to a very influential
law review article by Professor Sturley. 3°° Thus, the Court reached the
29 1Anthony M. Kennedy was born in 1936 in Sacramento, California. He received his A.B. from
Stanford University in 1958 and his J.D. from Harvard University in 1961 and also studied at the London
School of Economics. Following his admission to the California bar, he practiced law in San Francisco
and Sacramento for 13 years while also teaching as an adjunct professor at McGeorge School of Law.
In 1975, he was appointed to the Ninth Circuit. Upon the retirement of Justice Lewis Powell in 1987, a
major struggle between the Democratic Senate and President Ronald W. Reagan over a conservative
agenda for the Court led the Senate to reject the nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork. Following the
withdrawal of the nomination of Judge Douglas Ginsburg, President Reagan nominated Judge Kennedy,
who was confirmed without opposition.
292515 U.S. at 536.
2931d.
2941d. at 534.
2951d. at 535.
296499 U.S. at 603.
2971d. (referring to 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c).
29' 5 15 U.S. at 536.
299(1927) 29 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 169 (C.A.) (per Scrutton, J.).
3
°°See Influence, supra note 243, at 776-96 (describing conflicting interpretations of the Hague Rules
as the predictable product of independent aspects of domestic law with respect to Himalaya and choice
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conclusion that, excepting those Hague Rules signatories, such as Australia
and South Africa, with statutes expressly forbidding clauses that oust local
courts, no other signatories to the Hague Rules prohibited foreign forum
selection clauses under the rationale of Art. 3(8) of the Hague Rules (46
U.S.C. app. § 1303(8)). As such, the United States was obliged to honor its
treaty commitment to permit foreign forums and even foreign law.30 '
Justice Kennedy noted the argument that Japanese law, as interpreted by
the Japanese arbitration panel, would surely lessen carrier liability in at least
one respect: the carrier's non-delegable duty of proper stowage contained in
COGSA is not found in the Japanese Hague Rules because of a statutory
exception providing a defense to carriers for the acts or omissions of
stevedores. 30 2 Furthermore, the United States' version of the Hague Rules
requires COGSA to be applied to imports as well as exports, 30 3 although the
bill of lading clause selected Japanese law.
The Court did not rule on this issue because it considered it premature,
inasmuch as the "award-enforcement stage" 30 4 had not yet been reached.
This suggestion of a second litigation ignores the reality of the case being
decided. The cargo interests sued for cargo damage; the facts do not indicate
a shipowner counterclaim for unpaid freight, damage to the ship, or general
average contribution, thus there could not be an award against cargo to be
enforced and Japanese law ensured there could never be an award in favor
of the cargo interest. Justice Kennedy cited Mitsubishi30 5 to the effect that
"we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against
public policy" if persuaded that "the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law
clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right. .... -306
But with no arbitral award to be enforced, is Justice Kennedy suggesting a
review of the facts or law of an arbitration proceeding?
Justice O'Connor concurred in the result, but did not reject the Indussa
reasoning, because arbitration clauses, unlike forum selection clauses, do not
oust domestic courts. She was troubled by the reliance on the older British
of forum clauses and concluding that identification and explanation of the role of domestic law would
increase judicial awareness so that no more conflicts would arise).
301515 U.S. at 537-38.
302 d. at 539.
30346 U.S.C. app. § 1300.
304515 U.S. at 540.
305473 U.S. at 637.
306515 U.S. at 540. Graydon Staring has noted that the enforcement of foreign forum clauses must
occur through the equitable power of specific performance, and suggests that equitable defenses-fraud,
unconscionability, lack of clean hands, and strong public policy-may be used. Staring, Forgotten
Equity: The Enforcement of Forum Clauses, 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 405, 411 (1999).
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case, noting that she would disturb the unbroken line of Indussa authority
only to the extent necessary to decide this case. 307
Justice Stevens dissented here, as he did in Shute,30 8 rejecting the "novel"
construction of § 1303(8). He found the majority's interpretation to be
"flatly inconsistent with the purpose of COGSA." 309 He preferred the
pre-Harter act authority of Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix
Insurance Co.,310 as a declaration that exculpatory clauses violate public
policy and are void, and most importantly the Harter Act decision in Knott
v. Botany Worsted Mills,31I rejecting a British forum selection clause
because it relieved carrier liability. Justice Stevens found the majority's
reading of § 1303(8), dividing it into substantive and procedural aspects,
"perverse." 312 He also pointed to the national policies that transaction costs
should not exceed the potential recovery and the negotiability of bills of
lading should not suffer because of unenforceability. 31 3
Justice Stevens found application of the domestic passage ticket case to a
foreign arbitration clause to be a piece of wooden reasoning not even
compelled by Shute.314 He also claimed to be "baffled" by the Court's
suggestion that the consistency of the Harter Act interpretation of Knott in
Indussa is unfaithful to the treaty commitments in the Hague Rules. 315 His
view of the Australian and South African statutes against ousting the
jurisdiction of local courts is that those nations believe non-enforcement of
foreign forum selection clauses to be consistent with the international
obligation, thereby agreeing with the constant interpretation of § 1303(8)
3071d. at 542.
308499 U.S. at 603.
John Paul Stevens was born in Chicago in 1920. He attended the University of Chicago, where he
received his A.B. in 1941, served in the U.S. Navy (1942-45), and earned his J.D. from Northwestern
University in 1947. He then clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Wiley B. Rutledge (1947-48) and
practiced in Chicago from 1948-70, serving as an adjunct professor at the University of Chicago in 1954
and at Northwestern University in 1954-55. He was appointed to the Seventh Circuit in 1970 by
President Richard M. Nixon, and was elevated to the Supreme Court in 1975 by President Gerald R. Ford.
In his early years on the Court, he was regarded as a moderate between the Burger-Rehnquist wing and
the Brennan wing, but by 1999 he had become the Court's most "liberal" member. Justice Stevens has
authored many dissents and concurrences which can be characterized as blunt and confrontational. For
a 7-2 majority, however, he resurrected the privilege to travel for welfare recipients as a privilege and
immunity of U.S. citizens under Article IV, § 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment. See Saenz v. Doe, 119
S. Ct. 1518 (1999).
309515 U.S. at 550.3 10See supra note 68.
3"179 U.S. 69 (1900).
312515 U.S. at 551.
"'Id. at 551-52.3 141d. at 552.
315 Id. at 553.
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since Indussa.316 Lastly, he suggested a reading of the FAA and COGSA
that gives effect to both: a foreign arbitration clause may be invalid as illegal
under a separate federal statute in the same way that a clause obtained
through fraud, forgery, mistake, or unconscionability can be invalid without
in any way being hostile to arbitration generally, given that arbitration is
favored by congressional policy and the 1958 New York Convention on
arbitral awards.317
Because of the interlocutory appeal at the pleadings stage, the Supreme
Court has not foreclosed the issue of fundamental fairness in these clauses,
nor has it ruled on choice of law clauses in bills of lading. The carrier
interests had to invoke the FAA to stay the proceedings, and the issue of
whether arbitration in Tokyo under Japanese law lessened the carrier's
COGSA liability is still open for a trial on the merits or in a proceeding to
vacate the arbitration award.318 The Court in fact quoted Shute to the effect
that "forum-selection clauses contained in form passage contracts are subject
to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness. ' 319 Frequent and hostile
criticisms of foreign legal systems will certainly result from the course the
Supreme Court has taken and that will surely lead to the political confron-
tations that it sought to dispel 30 years ago in Sabbatino320 and most recently
in Kirkpatrick.32 1
VII
CONCLUSION
In its most recent COGSA decision, the Supreme Court has abandoned the
prism provided by history, policy, and precedent in favor of a speculative
interpretation of the treaty. Shippers contemplating bills of lading with
foreign law and foreign arbitration clauses may want to consider the years of
costly litigation with Iranian companies following the collapse of the Shah
when the Khomeini government tried to force disputes between American
business and Iranian concerns into Iranian revolutionary tribunals under
Iranian revolutionary law. 322 An absence of foreign arbitration clauses may
3161d. at 553-54.3171d. at 555-56.
3181d. at 540-41.
3 191d. at 539.
32
°Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).321W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).322See, e.g., Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 989 (1995);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948
(1985); Rockwell Int'l Systems, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1983); Itek Corp. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Boston, 704 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television,
691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982); KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979).
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even become a competitive factor between foreign shipowners, in view of
the small percentage of United States trade carried in United States flag
vessels.
The principal disservice of Sky Reefer to the concept of law as a means of
settling disputes is that where one trial on the merits sufficed under Indussa,
Sky Reefer opens up the possibility of two trials in every major cargo
damage dispute: a foreign court or arbitral decision "on the merits" followed
by an American decision on the fundamental fairness of the foreign decision.
Surely, this possibility requires corrective congressional action-and such a
course is included in the MLA's pending proposal to revise COGSA. 323
Thus, despite its 7-1 vote, the American maritime bar appears prepared to
overrule the Supreme Court by legislation. This is a far cry from the past,
when the Court was a bold force for positive change. In a future article, I
plan to show how the canons of statutory construction and the principles of
treaty interpretation could have been applied by the Justices to avoid this
result.
See generally Zimmett, Standby Letters of Credit in the Iran Litigation: Two Hundred Problems in Search
of a Solution, 16 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 927 (1984).323See supra note 189.
The April 16, 1999 draft of the COGSA revision proposal states in § 7 (Contracts of Carriage):
(i)(2) In General.-Except as provided in paragraph (4), a provision in a contract of carriage or
other agreement to which this subsection applies that specifies a foreign forum for litigation or
arbitration of a dispute to which this Act applies is null and void and of no effect if-
(A) the port of loading or the port of discharge is, or was intended to be, in the United States;
or
(B) the place where the goods are received by a carrier or the place where the goods are
delivered to a person authorized to receive them is, or was intended to be, in the United States.
(3) Court-Ordered Domestic Arbitration.-Except as provided in paragraph (4), if a contract of
carriage or other agreement to which this subsection applies specifies a foreign forum for
arbitration of a dispute to which this Act applies, then a court, on the timely motion of either party,
shall order that arbitration shall proceed in the United States.
(4) Subsequent Agreement of Parties.-Nothing in this subsection precludes the parties to a
dispute involving a claim under a contract of carriage or other agreement to which this subsection
applies from agreeing to resolve the dispute by litigation or arbitration in a foreign forum if that
agreement is executed after the claim arises.

